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SHADOW LAWYERING:  NONLAWYER PRACTICE WITHIN LAW FIRMS 
 
Paul R. Tremblay 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 Lawyers commonly associate with nonlawyers to assist in their performance of 
their lawyering tasks.  A lawyer cannot know with confidence, though, whether the 
delegation of some tasks to a nonlawyer colleague might result in her assisting in the 
unauthorized practice of law, because the state of the law and the commentary about 
nonlawyer practice is so confused and incoherent.  Some respected authority within the 
profession tells the lawyer that she may only delegate preparatory matters and must 
prohibit the nonlawyer from discussing legal matters with clients, or negotiating on 
behalf of clients.  Other authority suggests that the lawyer may delegate a wide array of 
tasks as long as the lawyer supervises the work of the nonlawyer and accepts 
responsibility for it.  A good faith lawyer reviewing the available commentary would find 
it difficult to achieve appropriate guidance for her work.  This uncertainty affects not 
only lawyers working with paralegals and law clerks, but firms hiring out of state lateral 
associates and partners, and law school clinical programs engaged in transactional 
work. 
 
 This Article articulates a framework for assessing delegation choices, a 
framework which is both coherent and sensible.  The framework relies on insights about 
lawyering judgment and risk assessment, client informed consent, and unauthorized 
practice of law prophylaxis.  Any delegation of work by a lawyer to a nonlawyer involves 
an exercise of the lawyer’s judgment about an appropriate balance of risk and efficiency, 
along with an eye toward the client’s informed choice about how to achieve the goals of 
the representation most efficiently.  The prevailing unauthorized practice of law dogma 
prevents a client from seeking the most economical representation by only retaining a 
nonlawyer, but that dogma trusts lawyers to protect a client’s interests.  With those 
considerations in place, this Article shows that the profession cannot, and in fact does 
not, deny the lawyer any categorical options in making delegation choices, except for 
those involving public court appearances.  Aside from sending a nonlawyer to court, a 
lawyer may responsibly delegate any of her lawyering activities to a nonlawyer 
associate, subject to the prevailing conceptions of competent representation and subject 
to the lawyer’s retaining ultimate responsibility for the resulting work product and 
performance. 
 
 Some commentary and some court opinions suggest a different answer to the 
questions addressed here, but those authorities do not withstand careful analysis.  This 
Article shows that a more careful reading of the commentary and the court dicta supports 
the framework and the thesis offered here.  Nonlawyers may not independently engage in 
activity which equates to the practice of law, if by “independently” we mean without 
supervision and oversight from a lawyer.  That important and uncontroversial limitation, 
however, is the only categorical restriction on a lawyer’s discretion.  A supervised 
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 SHADOW LAWYERING 3 
nonlawyer may play a much more active and important role in a lawyer’s overall 
representation of her client than many have claimed.  For the client, that is a very good 
result. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 This Article explores an aspect of contemporary legal practice that is the source of 
considerable confusion within the profession—the limits, if any, on the engagement in 
legal activity by nonlawyers who are employed by lawyers.  Much of the rhetoric from 
commentators and bar associations warns lawyers that they categorically may not 
delegate certain activities to their nonlawyer colleagues.1  Other authoritative sources 
imply that lawyers may lawfully exercise considerable discretion about how supervised 
nonlawyers work.2  The available substantive law on the topic is scarce and not entirely 
coherent.  This Article represents an effort to accomplish dual objectives—to understand 
the available substantive law and its lessons about delegation of work to nonlawyers, and 
to craft a coherent framework for addressing the topic, to guide lawyers and law firms in 
their practices.  To those ends, the Article proposes a workable and practical thesis about 
nonlawyer practice which is faithful to the spirit of the principles governing how lawyers 
work. 
 
 Nonlawyers, of course, may not practice law in any jurisdiction within the United 
States,3 subject to some limited exceptions not relevant here.4  Established common law 
and state statutes throughout the United States limit the practice of law to members of the 
 
                                                 
1  See, e.g., AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, MODEL GUIDELINES FOR THE UTILIZATION OF PARALEGAL 
SERVICES (2004) [hereinafter MODEL PARALEGAL GUIDELINES](declaring that paralegals may not provide 
legal advice to clients).  See text accompanying notes  infra for a discussion of the categorical limits. 
2  See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 4 (2002) [hereinafter 
RESTATEMENT] (suggesting lawyer discretion); see text accompanying notes  infra for a discussion of the 
discretionary authorities. 
3  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, R. 5.5(a) (2003) [hereinafter MODEL RULES]; RESTATEMENT 
supra note , at §4; DEBORAH L. RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE 15 (2004) [hereinafter RHODE, ACCESS TO 
JUSTICE]; Prohibitions on Practice of Nonlawyers, 21 ABA/BNA LAWYER'S MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL 
CONDUCT REFERENCE MANUAL 8001 (2004)(“Every jurisdiction prohibits the unauthorized practice of 
law.”). 
4  The exceptions include legal work on matters whose practice is preempted by federal law, such as patent 
and tax work (see Practice Rules for Representatives of Patent Applicants, 37 C.F.R. § 10.14 (2000); 
Circular 230 Regulating Practice Before the Treasury, 31 C.F.R. § 10.3 (2002) (governing practice before 
the Internal Revenue Service); Ted Schneyer, An Interpretation of Recent Developments in the Regulation 
of Law Practice, 30 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 559, 570-71 (2005)(discussing both contexts)); appearances 
before certain administrative agencies (see Marlene M. Remmert, Note, Representation of Clients before 
Administrative Agencies: Authorized or Unauthorized Practice of Law, 15 VAL. U. L. REV. 567, 577 
(1981)); and certain other legislative allowances (see Kathleen E. Justice, Note, There Goes the Monopoly: 
The California Proposal to Allow Nonlawyers to Practice Law, 44 VAND. L. REV 179 (1991)).  For an 
overview of the unauthorized practice rules and exceptions, see generally 2 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & 
W. WILLIAM HODES, 2 LAW OF LAWYERING § 5.5.201 (3d ed. 2001 & Supp. 2008) [hereinafter HAZARD & 
HODES]; CHARLES WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 824-49 (1986). 
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bar within the jurisdiction where the legal activity takes place.5  While the “unauthorized 
practice of law” dogma6 has many persuasive critics,7 its central premise is an essential 
conceit within the legal profession in this country—that only lawyers, defined as 
individuals licensed to practice in the jurisdiction, may provide legal services to clients.  
That otherwise stringent and unyielding dogma, though, historically has allowed 
nonlawyers to assist lawyers in their provision of legal services, so long as the assistance 
is supervised by a lawyer.8  The question we explore here is whether there are forms of 
assistance that the lawyer may not delegate to a nonlawyer, and that the nonlawyer may 
not perform even under a lawyer’s supervision.  This examination accepts, in a pragmatic 
way for the purposes of this Article, the inevitability and the persistence of the 
unauthorized practice of law dogma.9
 
 The intriguing questions about the scope of activity permitted to nonlawyers in 
law firms arise in several practice contexts.10  It obviously matters to the typical law firm, 
 
                                                 
5  For an overview of the policy and ethics debates about the unauthorized practice of law , see, e.g., 
DEBORAH L. RHODE & DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS 800-10 (5th ed. 2009); Roger C. Cramton, Delivery 
of Legal Services to Ordinary Americans, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 531, 567 (1994); Derek A. Denckla, 
Nonlawyers and the Unauthorized Practice of Law: An Overview of the Legal and Ethical Parameters, 67 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2581, 2597 (1999); Deborah L. Rhode, Policing the Professional Monopoly: A 
Constitutional and Empirical Analysis of Unauthorized Practice Prohibitions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1981).  
For a historical perspective, see Michael S. Ariens, American Legal Ethics in an Age of Anxiety, 40 ST. 
MARY’S L.J. 343 (2008). 
6  In this Article I refer to the collection of unauthorized practice of law mandates as a “dogma.”  My choice 
of term represents my effort to capture the inflexibility and, at times, unprincipled stubbornness of the 
arguments underlying the restrictions on nonlawyer practice.  See Deborah L. Rhode, Professionalism in 
Perspective: Alternative Approaches to Nonlawyer Practice, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 701, 703, 
711-12 (1996) [hereinafter Rhode, Professionalism] (unauthorized practice rules promote a monopoly of 
legal practice for licensed attorneys, which reduces availability of affordable legal services). 
7  See, e.g., RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE, supra note  , at 88-89; Peter S. Margulies, Protecting the Public 
Without Protectionism: Access, Competence and Pro Hac Vice Admission to the Practice of Law, 7 ROGER 
WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 285, 285 (2002) (noting unauthorized practice of law restrictions “impair client 
access to attorneys of their choice”). 
8  See MODEL RULES, supra note  , at R. 5.3 (“Responsibilities Regarding Nonlawyer Assistants”); In re 
Opinion No. 24 of Committee on Unauthorized Practice of Law, 607 A.2d 962, 966 (N.J. 
1992)(acknowledging the importance of nonlawyer assistance to lawyers). 
9  In other words, this Article is not an inquiry into whether nonlawyers should be permitted greater 
opportunities to practice law.  That topic is well rehearsed elsewhere.  See, e.g., RHODE, ACCESS TO 
JUSTICE, supra note  , at ; George C. Leef, The Case for a Free Market in Legal Services, 322 POLICY 
ANALYSIS 1 (1998); Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Lawyers, Non-Lawyers and Mediation:  Rethinking the 
Professional Monopoly from a Problem-Solving Perspective, 7 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 235 (2002).  The 
goal in this Article is to test the limits of nonlawyer practice in light of, and respecting, existing 
unauthorized practice restrictions. 
10  One context which this Article will not address, despite its apparent connection to this project, is the 
status of suspended or disbarred lawyers working as clerks, paralegals or assistants within law firms.  
While one might expect that the analyses and critiques developed in this Article would apply naturally to 
those persons, in fact the jurisprudence treats those individuals more strictly than other nonlawyers.  See, 
e.g., Crawford v. State Bar of Cal., 355 P.2d 490 (Cal. 1960); The Florida Bar v. Thomson, 310 So.2d 300 
(Fla.1975); In re Discipio, 645 N.E.2d 906, 911 (Ill. 1995) (“Without a doubt, a disbarred or suspended 
attorney should not serve as a law clerk or a paralegal during his disbarment or suspension.”).  For an 
example of a state professional conduct rule limiting the rights of disbarred or suspended lawyers, see N.M. 
RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 16-505 (disbarred or suspended lawyers may not be employed as law clerks if 
Forthcoming, 85 Indiana Law Journal                     Do not cite or quote without permission  
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whether a solo practice or a major international organization, where paralegals regularly 
assist in preparation for every imaginable type of legal work—complex commercial 
transactions, real estate closings, divorce settlements, pretrial litigation and trial 
preparation, and the like.  Lawyers in those settings ought to understand the kinds of 
limits that exist on their use of nonlawyer assistants in their practices.11
 
 The question also arises, though, in a more defined and perhaps interesting way in 
the setting of a large, national law firm which hires lateral partners and associates from 
law firms in other states.12  In lateral hiring settings, the new lawyer, who may be 
exquisitely experienced and valuable as a member of the new firm, and who will likely be 
offered a handsome salary to join the new firm, remains a nonlawyer until she passes the 
new state’s bar examination or otherwise waives into that state’s bar admission.13  The 
new law firm must understand the limits of the lateral’s authority to offer her valuable 
and highly-compensated services to the firm’s clients.  If the law firm guesses wrong 
about the contours of the lateral’s role, it risks serious consequences.14  For laterals who 
are litigators, discrete avenues exist through which to obtain formal permission for her to 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
prohibited from accepting employment by order of the Supreme Court or the Disciplinary Board).  See 
also, NFPA Takes Stand on Disbarred, Suspended Attorneys, 20 No. 5 LEGAL MGMT. 16 
(September/October, 2001) (reporting National Federation of Paralegal Associations (NFPA) resolution 
that “it is unethical for attorneys whose licenses have been revoked or who are under suspension to gain 
employment and perform legal tasks handled by paralegals”). 
11  As the discussion below will highlight, trade associations have developed some standards to which 
lawyers and paralegals may look for guidance.  This article critiques those standards in its effort to 
reconcile some of the inconsistent messages arising from the guides.  The most prominent guides include 
those of the ABA and the National Association of Legal Assistants (NALA).  See MODEL PARALEGAL 
GUIDELINES, supra note ; NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF LEGAL ASSISTANTS, CODE OF ETHICS AND 
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Canon 3 (1995), at http://www.nala.org/whatis-Code.htm (last visited 
March 6, 2009)[hereinafter NALA CODE OF ETHICS]. 
12  Lateral movement among lawyers is a growing phenomenon.  See Aric Press, In-House: The Lateral 
Report, THE AMERICAN LAWYER (February 01, 2009) at 
http://www.law.com/jsp/tal/PubArticleTAL.jsp?id=1202427749058 (last visited March 6, 2009) (“A record 
number of Am Law 100 and 200 partners changed firms last year, according to our annual report.”)  For a 
discussion of the migrating lawyer phenomenon and the conflict of interest implications of that reality, see 
Paul R. Tremblay, Migrating Lawyers and the Ethics of Conflict Checking, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 489 
(2006). 
13  A lawyer may not simply join a new state’s bar at will upon changing residence.  See Christine R. Davis, 
Approaching Reform: The Future of Multijurisdictional Practice in Today's Legal Profession, 29 FLA. ST. 
U. L. REV. 1339, 1362 (2002) (28 jurisdictions allow lawyers admitted in another state to practice in the 
courts of their state; 15 require the state from which the attorney is licensed to allow similar reciprocity to 
attorneys from their state); Andrew M. Perlman, A Bar Against Competition: The Unconstitutionality of 
Admission Rules for Out-of-State Lawyers,” 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 135, 137-38 (2004)(critiquing those 
restrictions). 
14  See, e.g., Birbrower v. Superior Court, 949 P.2d 1, 18 (Cal. 1998)(firm violated state unauthorized 
practice of law statute while serving California client by using attorneys in negotiation settlements and 
preliminary arbitration arrangements who were not licensed to practice in California).  See generally, 
William T. Barker, Extrajudicial Practice by Lawyers, 56 BUS. LAW 1501 (2001); Cynthia L. Fountaine, 
Have License, Will Travel: An Analysis of the New ABA Multijurisdictional Practice Rules, 81 WASH. U. 
L.Q. 737, 738 (2003); H. Geoffrey Moulton, Jr., Federalism and Choice of Law in the Regulation of Legal 
Ethics, 82 MINN. L. REV. 73, 82-83 (1997) (each reviewing Birbrower and its implications, and the ABA 
response to the case). 
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engage in the practice of law in the new state on discrete matters.15  If the new lateral is a 
transactional lawyer, however, the uncertainties addressed here are palpable and trigger 
serious professional responsibility questions. 
 
 The recognition that this question has more importance within corporate and 
transactional practice than in litigation practice suggests yet another setting where the 
resolution of the questions addressed here has great importance.  In recent years, law 
schools have begun to offer clinical courses in which law students, for credit, engage in 
the representation of small businesses and nonprofit corporations under the supervision of 
a faculty member.16  In these clinics, students are expected to assume the role of a 
practicing lawyer with much, and sometimes almost complete, responsibility for the 
client’s representation.  That role assumption, indeed, is central to the clinical 
pedagogical model.17  In traditional litigation clinics, students may assume that lawyer 
role without running afoul of unauthorized practice principles by virtue of a “student 
practice rule” in effect in the state where the law school sits.18  But, the student practice 
rules of nearly all states are silent about students’ practice in transactional settings.19  
Without a student practice rule in place, students who wish to represent clients in a 
transactional clinic are effectively nonlawyers.  Faculty and students in such clinics 
therefore must understand confidently the limits of that nonlawyer role.20
 
                                                 
15  Lawyers may appear in court with permission of a judge under a procedure known as “pro hac vice.”  
For a discussion of the pro hac vice accommodation, see note  infra. 
16  For a description of the emerging clinical movement in transactional and community development work, 
see Alicia Alvarez, Community Development Clinics: What Does Poverty Have to Do with Them?, 34 
FORDHAM URB. L. J. 1269 (2007);  Susan R. Jones, Promoting Social and Economic Justice Through 
Interdisciplinary Work in Transactional Law, 14 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 249 (2004); Susan R. Jones, Small 
Business and Community Economic Development: Transactional Lawyering for Social Change and 
Economic Justice, 4 CLINICAL L. REV. 195 (1997)[hereinafter Jones, Transactional Lawyering for Social 
Change];  Shauna I. Marshall, Mission Impossible?: Ethical Community Lawyering, 7 CLINICAL L. REV. 
147 (2000);  Peter Pitegoff, Law School Initiatives in Housing and Community Development, 4 B.U. PUB. 
INT. L.J. 275 (1995). 
17  See, e.g., Russell Engler, The MacCrate Report Turns 10: Assessing Its Impact and Identifying Gaps We 
Should Seek to Narrow, 8 CLINICAL L. REV. 109, 169 (2001); Jennifer A. Gundlach, “This Is a Courtroom, 
Not a Classroom”: So What Is the Role of the Clinical Supervisor?, 13 CLINICAL L. REV. 279 (2006); Peter 
A. Joy, The Ethics of Law School Clinic Students as Student Lawyers, 45 S. TEX. L. REV. 815 (2004); 
James E. Moliterno, In-House Live-Client Clinical Programs: Some Ethical Issues, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 
2377 (1999). 
18  Every state has a student practice rule outlining the requirements under which students may perform 
lawyering tasks.  See David F. Chavkin, Am I My Client's Lawyer?: Role Definition and the Clinical 
Supervisor, 51 SMU L. REV. 1507, Appendix A (1998) (cataloguing student practice rules from all states).     
See text accompanying notes  infra. 
19  As we see below, those student practice rules are nearly uniform in their addressing only court 
representation and litigation contexts; they are silent on the possibilities of students performing work 
outside of the litigation setting.  See Sara B. Lewis, Note, Rite of Professional Passage: A Case for the 
Liberalization of Student Practice Rules, 82 MARQ. L. REV. 205 (1998) (addressing inadequacies in current 
student practice rules and proposing a better mode of regulation for students in clinical settings).  See text 
accompanying notes  infra. 
20  The other increasingly important context in which these questions have direct relevance is that involving 
the use of foreign lawyers as adjuncts to United States law firm practice.  For a discussion of that 
phenomenon, see Richard Abel, Transnational Law Practice, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 737, 750-61 
(1994);  Michele Gilligan, Another Effect of Globalization: Role of Foreign Educated Lawyers in Maryland 
Forthcoming, 85 Indiana Law Journal                     Do not cite or quote without permission  
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 This Article will refer to all of those actors as nonlawyers, rather than referring to 
them in the more narrow conception of paralegal.21  While all paralegals are of course 
nonlawyers, many nonlawyers, like lateral soon-to-be-partners22 and associates or law 
students engaged in transactional work in a clinic, are different in important ways from 
the usual understanding of paralegals.  I use a broader term for a substantive reason as 
well.  The thesis developed here is a unified one, applicable to all nonlawyers regardless 
of their status within a law firm, while by its terms accounting for the difference in skill 
and experience of the nonlawyers to whom a lawyer has delegated some legal 
responsibility.  
 
 The thesis which this Article will defend emerges from an appreciation of three 
features central to effective practice as understood by the prevailing law and ethics of 
lawyering.  First, it recognizes the importance of the lawyer’s professional practical 
judgment and risk assessment in accomplishing legal work for a client.23  Second, the 
thesis acknowledges the relationship between the lawyer’s pragmatic judgments and the 
client’s informed consent.24  And finally, it builds upon the reality of, and the rationales 
underlying, the unauthorized practice of law prophylaxis.25  Those features understood in 
concert permit the following thesis to emerge: 
 
A lawyer may delegate to a nonlawyer working in her law firm any lawyering 
task, except for appearances before tribunals such as courts, so long as the lawyer 
adequately supervises the nonlawyer and accepts full professional responsibility 
for the resulting work.  The lawyer’s delegation decisions remain subject to the 
competence and malpractice standards generally applicable to lawyering work, as 
well as the informed buy-in of the lawyer’s client. 
 
 This thesis does not accommodate categorical, preemptive rules limiting a 
lawyer’s delegation choices, except for the pragmatic categorical exception regarding 
public tribunals, which acknowledges the practical operation of courts,26 as well as 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Practice, 37 U. BALT. L.F. 1, 12 (2006); Darya V. Pollak, “I'm Calling My Lawyer ... In India!”:  Ethical 
Issues in International Legal Outsourcing, 11 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 99 (2006); Carole Silver, 
The Case of the Foreign Lawyer: Internationalizing the U.S. Legal Profession, 25 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 
1039 (2002). 
21  The Model Rules use the term “nonlawyer.”  See MODEL RULES, supra note  , at R. 5.3.  The ABA 
standards use the term “paralegals.”  See MODEL PARALEGAL GUIDELINES, supra note  . 
22  Nonlawyers may not be equity partners in law firms in most jurisdictions.  See MODEL RULES, supra 
note , at  R. 5.4(b), and discussion at text accompanying notes – infra.  But see NEW YORK CODE OF PROF’L 
RESPONSIBILITY, DR 2-102(D)(out of state lawyers may be partners in New York law firms in certain 
circumstances). 
23  See text accompanying notes  infra. 
24  See text accompanying notes  infra. 
25  See text accompanying notes  infra. 
26  Out of state lawyers typically may appear in courts with the permission of the presiding judge under a 
scheme known as “pro hac vice.” See RESTATEMENT, supra note  , at  §3, cmt. e (describing the practice); 
cf. Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438 (1979)(no constitutional right to gain pro hac vice admission).  See also 
Peter S. Margulies, Protecting the Public Without Protectionism: Access, Competence and Pro Hac Vice 
Admission to the Practice of Law, 7 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 285 (2002) (describing the pro hac vice 
Forthcoming, 85 Indiana Law Journal                     Do not cite or quote without permission  
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limitations on the management of and ownership in law firms, which are separate matters 
from the concerns assessed here.27  The thesis is fully consistent with a nuanced 
appreciation of the available substantive law, although it is arguably inconsistent in some 
ways with much advisory pronouncement on the topic.  As we shall see below,28 one 
significant categorical topic muddies the thesis—the oft-repeated advisory prohibition 
against nonlawyers giving legal advice to a client.29  That prohibition, upon reflection 
and careful review of the available substantive law, is neither sustainable nor coherent.  
While nonlawyers cannot, in light of the unauthorized practice dogma, offer independent 
advice or counsel to a client, they may properly communicate supervised legal advice as 
part of a collaboration with the lawyer responsible for the matter.30
 
 The Article will explore these issues in the following way.  It begins in Part I with 
a story, populated by a lawyer practicing in a law firm with several nonlawyers available 
to assist him.  My intention is to use the story to highlight the various ways in which 
nonlawyers of differing experience and training might assist in contributing to the 
resolution of a client’s legal matter.  Part II summarizes the substantive law and advisory 
authority available to an observer looking for guidance on the questions posed here.  Part 
II concludes that the advisory authority’s insistence that certain categorical activity is off 
limits for nonlawyers is not supported by binding common law, rules or statutes. 
 
 Part III develops the thesis just described.  It describes the three features central to 
a thoughtful assessment of nonlawyer participation—lawyering judgment, client 
autonomy, and unauthorized practice rationales.  It then unpacks the justifications for the 
profession’s acceptance of nonlawyer assistance in the “easy” instances (drafting 
documents, performing legal research, and investigating facts), and proceeds to show 
how those justifications presume a lawyer’s exercise of judgment about risk and benefit 
in her fiduciary role on her client’s behalf.  Once unpacked, the risk assessment and 
lawyering judgment factors operate to support the thesis that there are, or ought to be, no 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
rules).  The court appearance exception is not a principled one, but instead a pragmatic one, recognizing the 
reality of American litigation practice.  It is also noncontroversial, both because of its public character (a 
judge has control over his court and can decide definitively who may say what words or take what actions 
in the courtroom) and because lawyers do not struggle with the uncertainties within that sphere that they 
encounter in their out-of-court or in-office practices. 
27  The legal profession closely protects its exclusive ownership and management of law practice.  See 
MODEL RULES, supra note  , at R. 5.4(a)(lawyers may not share fees with nonlawyers); 5.4(b) (no 
partnership with nonlawyers), 5.4(d) (no nonlawyer ownership in law firms); RESTATEMENT, supra note  , 
at §10.  For a sampling of the critique of that protectionist stance (which this Article will not challenge for 
its purposes), see Mary C. Daly, Choosing Wise Men Wisely: The Risks and Rewards of Purchasing Legal 
Services from Lawyers in a Multidisciplinary Partnership, 13 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 217 (2000); Gillian 
Hadfield, Legal Barriers to Innovation: The Growing Economic Cost of Professional Control over 
Corporate Legal Market, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1689 (2008); Charles W. Wolfram, The ABA and MDPs: 
Context, History, and Process, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1625 (2000). 
28  See text accompanying notes infra. 
29  See, e.g., VIRGINIA PENINSULA PARALEGAL ASSOCIATION (VAPPA), EDUCATIONAL STANDARDS AND 
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY GUIDELINES FOR PARALEGALS IN THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
(1995), at http://www.vappa.org/guidelines.html (last visited February 27, 2009) [hereinafter VAPA 
GUIDELINES](“paralegal shall not give legal advice or opinions”). 
30  See text accompanying notes  infra. 
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categorical exceptions to a lawyer’s delegation discretion.  Part IV then returns to the law 
firm story, to show how the thesis might operate in context. 
 
I. A LAW FIRM STORY 
 
 Any analysis of the limits of nonlawyer practice within a law firm would benefit 
from some concrete context.  Let us, then, imagine the following story:31
 
 Essex Legal Services Institute (ELSI) is a state- and foundation-funded 
legal aid organization offering free legal services to low- and moderate-income 
persons within Essex County, Massachusetts.32  ELSI has traditionally offered 
individual litigation services—family law, housing and eviction defense, Social 
Security disability appeals, and the like—to its individual clients, in addition to 
performing “impact” litigation on behalf of groups of poor clients.33  ELSI 
recently hired Dara Coletta, a community economic development lawyer with 
four years experience in California, to join its program to establish a new 
community economic development (CED) project, to offer representation of 
nonprofits and community-based organizations in an effort to contribute to the 
asset-building of its constituents.34  Coletta has applied to take the Massachusetts 
bar, and with luck she will be a Massachusetts lawyer within nine months.  Her 
supervisor at ELSI is Joe Bartholomew, a 22-year veteran of Massachusetts legal 
services practice but a relative newcomer to the transactional issues which the 
new CED project will encounter. 
 
 
                                                 
31  The story chosen here emerges from public interest practice, even though an equally useful story would 
use a private law firm setting.  I choose a legal services organization, though, for a very direct purpose.  As 
the story indicates, it permits the comparison of an experienced lateral lawyer, a certified law student, a 
non-certified law student, and a novice paralegal intern, to test whether the qualifications and experience of 
the legal assistant/nonlawyer make a difference in the analysis.  Since private law firms cannot use certified 
law students, the public interest setting offers a better opportunity for comparison.  Of course, the 
assessments of the limits of the unauthorized practice dogma arising in this setting should be fully 
transferable to the private firm setting. 
32  ELSI is entirely fictional, although Essex County, Massachusetts is not.  ELSI has appeared before.  See  
Paul R. Tremblay, Acting “A Very Moral Type of God”: Triage Among Poor Clients, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 
2475, 2483 (1999). 
33  Neighborhood legal services offices have traditionally focused on crisis-driven, litigation-centric 
services for the poor clients in their communities.  For an assessment of the role tensions of such offices, 
see Marshall J. Breger, Legal Aid for the Poor: A Conceptual Analysis, 60 N.C. L. REV. 282, 285 & n.14 
(1982); Marc Feldman, Political Lessons: Legal Services for the Poor, 83 GEO. L.J. 1529, 1536-38 (1995); 
Peter Margulies, Political Lawyering, One Person at a Time: The Challenge of Legal Work Against 
Domestic Violence for the Impact Litigation/Client Service Debate, 3 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 493, 497, 502 
(1996). 
34  Poverty lawyers have an increasing interest in community economic development, rather than the 
traditional litigation services, as an essential part of community empowerment.  See WILLIAM H. SIMON, 
THE COMMUNITY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT MOVEMENT: LAW, BUSINESS AND THE NEW SOCIAL POLICY 
(2000); Scott L. Cummings, Community Economic Development as Progressive Politics: Towards a 
Grassroots Movement for Economic Justice, 54 STAN. L. REV. 399 (2001); Scott Cummings, Developing 
Cooperatives as a Job Creation Strategy for Low-income Workers, 25 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 181 
(1999); Jones, Transactional Lawyering for Social Change, supra note  ; Marshall, supra note  . 
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 One of the CED project’s first new clients is the Montrose Community 
Development Corporation (MCDC), which is in the midst of developing 33 units 
of below-market condominium housing for sale to low- and moderate-income first 
time home buyers.  Coletta agreed with MCDC for ELSI to serve as its counsel in 
the final development stages, and then in the sale transactions, from the purchase 
& sale agreements through the final closings to qualified families.  Because the 
condominium development includes deed restrictions (to maintain the 
affordability of the units over time), the MCDC documents will include special 
master covenants and other sophisticated tools to achieve the project’s mission.35
 
 ELSI assigned three part-time staff members to work with Bartholomew 
and Coletta on the MCDC project: 
 
• David Dahlstrom is a third-year law student who had been working in 
ELSI’s Housing Unit, defending evictions in court.  Dahlstrom has 
obtained the status of “certified law student” under the Massachusetts 
Student Practice Rule.36 
• Julie Lucia is a second-year law student who had been working in ELSI’s 
Welfare Unit, preparing and attending welfare hearings.  Lucia is not a 
certified law student under the state student practice rule, because the rule 
does not cover her work in this public interest setting,37 and because she 
need not be certified as a student lawyer to engage in welfare hearing 
representation.38 
• Mike Newman is a volunteer intern at ELSI.  He is a 19 year old 
sophomore at Tufts University, and he has been assisting ELSI this year 
with clerical and administrative help. 
 
Coletta, with Bartholomew as her supervisor, intends to use her team to perform 
all of the legal work for the MCDC transactions, including drafting all of the real 
estate documents, researching the applicable law governing deed restrictions and 
zoning requirements, counseling MCDC about its legal options regarding the deed 
restrictions and covenants to be included in the condominium documents as well 
as the terms of the sales, negotiating discrete terms with the buyers or the buyers’ 
lawyers, and representing MCDC at each of the closings. 
 
 
                                                 
35  For a discussion of this kind of housing program, see CHARLES E. DAY, ET AL., HOUSING AND 
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT 240-43 (1999)(reviewing the HOME Investment and Partnerships Act of 
1990).  See also 42 U.S.C. § 12771 (requiring 15% of HOME funds to be distributed to nonprofits like 
MCDC). 
36  See Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct. Rule 3:03.  Under the Massachusetts student practice rule, David may appear as 
a lawyer in the District Courts of Massachusetts, so he may try cases in those courts just as a fully licensed 
lawyer. 
37  See id.  A second-year student may only be certified in Massachusetts if she is enrolled in a law school 
clinical program.  Rule 3:03(8). 
38  See Remmert, supra note  , at . 
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 This story present five individuals working within a proper law firm39 engaged in 
the representation of a client on a legal matter.  This story also described five persons, 
only two of whom are deemed lawyers licensed to practice law in Massachusetts (Joe 
Bartholomew and David Dahlstrom).  The question is what activities any of these five 
persons may engage in to represent MCDC.  To answer that question, we must canvass 
the substantive law governing nonlawyer practice within a law firm, as well as the 
advisory authority on that topic.  Because it tends to be clearer (if at times inconsistent), 
we start with the advisory authority, and then connect those teaching to the binding law 
on the topic. 
 
II. ADVISORY GUIDANCE AND SUBSTANTIVE LAW REGULATING NONLAWYER 
PRACTICE 
 
A. Advisory Rhetoric 
 
 Only licensed lawyers may represent clients, of course, but all authorities agree 
that lawyers may delegate tasks to nonlawyers to assist them in that representation.  The 
Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers40 describes the scope of a nonlawyer’s role 
as follows: 
 
For obvious reasons of convenience and better service to clients, lawyers and law 
firms are empowered to retain nonlawyer personnel to assist firm lawyers in 
providing legal services to clients.  In the course of that work, a nonlawyer may 
conduct activities that, if conducted by that person alone in representing a client, 
would constitute unauthorized practice.  Those activities are permissible and do 
not constitute unauthorized practice, so long as the responsible lawyer or law firm 
provides appropriate supervision (see § 11, Comment e), and so long as the 
nonlawyer is not permitted to own an interest in the law firm, split fees, or 
exercise management powers with respect to a law practice aspect of the firm (see 
§ 10).41
 
Aside from its recognition that lawyers may not assign management, equity and 
ownership interests to nonlawyers,42 the Restatement’s proposition does not suggest any 
 
                                                 
39  A legal services organization is a law firm entitled to practice law, in precisely the same fashion as any 
private law firm partnership, professional corporation (PC), or limited liability partnership (LLP).  See, e.g., 
MODEL RULES, supra note , at R. 1.0(c); RESTATEMENT, supra note  , at §123(2)(lawyers in a legal services 
organization treated as members of a law firm). 
40  RESTATEMENT, supra note  . 
41  Id. at §4, cmt. g.  The Restatement’s citation of Section 11, Comment e is perplexing and possibly 
reflects a clerical error in the Restatement text.  Section 11, Comment f addresses the lawyer’s supervisory 
responsibility of nonlawyers, while Comment e addresses supervising subordinate lawyers.  Perhaps, then, 
the drafters intended to refer to Comment f instead of e.  On the other hand, because Comment f states that 
“[d]uties corresponding to those of a lawyer with respect to other firm lawyers exist with respect to 
supervising nonlawyers in a law firm,” the drafters may have intended to refer the reader to Comment e for 
guidance about supervision obligations generally. 
42  The exceptions to that conclusion identified within the Restatement are not categorical ones excluding 
certain lawyering activities, but only address ownership and management functions within the law firm, 
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categorical exclusions from its basic lesson that, with “appropriate supervision,” lawyers 
may assign any of their work to nonlawyers.  The Restatement’s later discussion of a 
lawyer’s supervision responsibility confirms that the treatise contemplates that supervised 
nonlawyers would provide legal advice to a client.43
 
 The Restatement position is entirely sensible, as we shall see below,44 and 
supports the thesis developed in this Article.  But the Restatement does not acknowledge, 
either in its comments or its Reporter’s Notes, a widespread and long-standing contrary 
assertion—that a lawyer may not delegate certain legal tasks to a nonlawyer, even if the 
lawyer supervises the nonlawyer and retains full responsibility for the resulting client 
representation work.  An American Bar Association formal ethics opinion introduced the 
concept of certain categorical exclusions with the following advice to the bar in 1968: 
 
[W]e do not limit the kind of assistants the lawyer can acquire in any way to 
persons who are admitted to the Bar, so long as the nonlawyers do not do things 
that lawyers may not do or do the things that lawyers only may do.45
 
The highlighted language suggests that some lawyering tasks are beyond delegation, and 
the opinion makes clear that it refers not to the management, equity interest or ownership 
considerations that the Restatement carved out.46  The opinion identifies two categorical 
limitations on lawyer delegation to nonlawyers: “counsel[ing] clients about law 
matters”47 and “appear[ing] in court or ... in formal proceedings as part of the judicial 
process.”48   
 
 The restrictions suggested by the ABA in 1968 have appeared frequently, and 
continue to appear, in advisory authorities.  The South Carolina Supreme Court has 
suggested, in dictum, a similar limitation on the scope of the nonlawyer’s role: 
 
The activities of a paralegal do not constitute the practice of law as long as they 
are limited to work of a preparatory nature, such as legal research, investigation, 
or the composition of legal documents, which enable the licensed attorney-
employer to carry a given matter to a conclusion through his own examination, 
approval or additional effort.49
 
                                                                                                                                                 
restrictions which are not at all controversial  See note – supra (describing the restrictions on lay 
participation in law firms, and critiques of the restrictions). 
43  RESTATEMENT, supra note  , at §11, cmt. f.  In Comment f, the Restatement warns lawyer to establish 
supervision protocols to “assure that any advice given [by the nonlawyer] is appropriate.” 
44  See text accompanying notes  infra. 
45  ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 316 (1968)(emphasis added). 
46  RESTATEMENT, supra note  , at §4, cmt. g. 
47  ABA Op. 316, supra note  . 
48  Id.  The opinion does identify a third categorical exclusion, “engag[ing] directly in the practice of law,” 
see id., but that limitation contributes nothing useful to the inquiry.  It begs the question it purports to 
answer. 
49  Matter of Easler, 272 S.E.2d 32, 32-33 (S.C. 1980)(emphasis added)(dictum).  The South Carolina 
Supreme Court later, in more dicta, expanded on the Easler precedent to claim that nonlawyers may not 
provide legal advice.  Doe v. Condon, 532 S.E.2d 879 (S.C. 2000)(“answering legal questions would 
constitute the unauthorized practice of law”). 
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In 2004 the ABA Standing Committee on Paralegals published model guidelines for the 
use of nonlawyers by lawyers.50  One commentator describes the model standards’ 
limitations as covering the following three activities: 
 
The ABA Model Guidelines for the Utilization of Legal Assistant Services 
delineate three responsibilities a lawyer may not delegate to a legal assistant: 
establishing an attorney-client relationship, setting the fee to be charged for a 
legal service, and rendering a legal opinion to a client.51
 
Like the ABA Model Guidelines, the Code of Ethics and Professional Responsibility of 
the National Association of Legal Assistants (NALA) advises its members that they may 
not “give legal opinions or advice.”52  Several state bar ethics opinions and guidelines for 
paralegal practice echo the same categorical exclusion for offering legal advice53 and, 
some times, for negotiating on behalf of a client.54
 
 Of course, none of the sources just quoted or cited represents binding legal 
authority for any practicing lawyer.55  State ethics opinions are advisory and do not carry 
enforcement authority.56  The Restatement also does not represent binding substantive 
law,57 although it enjoys considerable respect within American jurisprudence.58
 
                                                 
50  MODEL PARALEGAL GUIDELINES, supra note  , at . 
51  Kathleen Maher, No Substitutions: Legal Aides Are Crucial, But Some Tasks Lawyers Should Not 
Delegate, 87-OCT A.B.A. J. 66 (2001)(emphasis added).  The author cites to the Model Paralegal 
Guidelines, see MODEL PARALEGAL GUIDELINES, supra note  , presumably as they existed in 2001.  
Because Maher refers to the guidelines with a slightly different name (“Legal Assistants” instead of 
“Paralegals”), the version of the guidelines she interprets may have been different.  Her summary fits the 
2004 version accurately, however. 
52  NALA CODE OF ETHICS, supra note  , at Canon 3.  The NALA Canon also includes the restriction for 
“represent[ing] a client before a court or agency unless so authorized by that court or agency.”  Id. 
53  See, e.g., VAPA GUIDELINES, supra note  (“paralegal shall not give legal advice or opinions”); State Bar 
of Michigan, Role of Nonlawyers in Law Practice: Guidelines for Utilization of Legal Assistant Services, 
Guideline 2, at http://www.michbar.org/opinions/ethics/utilization.cfm (last visited February 27, 
2009)(nonlawyer may not “convey to persons outside the law firm the legal assistant’s opinion” about legal 
matters) ; State Bar of Georgia, Advisory Opinion No. 21, September 16, 1977 at 
http://www.gabar.org/handbook/state_disciplinary_board_opinions/adv_op_21/ (last visited February 27, 
2009)(prohibiting “[a]ny contact with clients or opposite counsel requiring the rendering of legal advice of 
any type”); State Bar of Florida, Ethics Opinion 89-5 (1989) at  
http://www.floridabar.org/TFB/TFBETOpin.nsf/ca2dcdaa853ef7b885256728004f87db/c4d872ab4be4c548
85256b2f006ca8f3?OpenDocument (last visited February 27, 2009)(no legal advice); Supreme Court of the 
State of New Hampshire, Administrative Rule 35, Guidelines for the Utilization by Lawyers of the Services 
of Legal Assistants under the New Hampshire Rules of Professional Conduct, Comment 1 to Rule 5.3, at 
http://www.courts.state.nh.us/rules/scr/scr-35.htm (last visited February 27, 2009)(no legal advice). 
54  For negotiation limits, see sources cited at note  infra. 
55  The language quoted above from the opinion of the South Carolina Supreme Court was dictum in the 
case before the court.  See Matter of Easler, supra note , at  . 
56  See Peter A. Joy, Making Ethics Opinions Meaningful: Toward More Effective Regulation of Lawyers’ 
Conduct, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 313 (2002) (arguing that the varying levels of authority of ethics 
opinions in jurisdictions lead to their uncertain authority as a source of advice for lawyers). 
57  See Harold G. Maier, The Utilitarian Role of a Restatement of Conflicts in a Common Law System: How 
Much Judicial Deference Is Due to the Restaters or “Who Are These Guys, Anyway?,” 75 IND. L.J. 541, 
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B. Authority from Rules or Statutes 
 
 A handful of states provide for some guidance to lawyers using nonlawyer 
assistants, as well as to the nonlawyers themselves, regarding the scope of activity 
permitted to be delegated.  California, perhaps the only state in the country which 
licenses and regulates the practice of paralegals,59 includes in its licensing statute a 
limitation on a paralegal’s offering independent legal advice,60 and in that way provides 
some authoritative substantive law on the topic.61  Similarly, the Rules of the Supreme 
Court of the State of New Hampshire offer “Guidelines for the Utilization by Lawyers of 
the Services of Legal Assistants,” and those rules include a Comment which refers to a 
lawyer’s obligation to ensure that legal assistant “does not provide legal advice.”62  Even 
that prohibition, which, while labeled as a Comment, likely qualifies as binding 
substantive law in New Hampshire, strongly implies by its surrounding language that its 
intent is to prohibit only unsupervised legal advice by a nonlawyer.63  The Rules 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
548 (2000) (arguing that no restatement has any independent legal force, and can never be more than a 
guide); Ted Schneyer, The ALI’s Restatement and the ABA’s Model Rules: Rivals or Complements?, 46 
OKLA. L. REV. 25, 30 (1993) (arguing that professional ethics law is far from uniform; any attempt to 
“restate” it must make policy choices, and must pass judgment on the Model Rules); Fred C. Zacharias, 
Fact and Fiction in the Restatement of Law Governing Lawyers: Should the Confidentiality Provisions 
Restate the Law?, 6 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 903, 926 (1993) (individual states have made a conscious choice 
to address idiosyncratic jurisprudential differences, thus making any attempt to restate the law governing 
lawyers ineffective); see also Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Silences of the Restatement of the Law 
Governing Lawyers: Lawyering as Only Adversary Practice, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 631, 669 (1997) 
(Restatement should go further in crafting new “law” for lawyers to emphasize that lawyers should 
discourage litigation). 
58  See Lawrence J. Latto, The Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers: A View from the Trenches, 26 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 697 (1998) (review of the deliberation and debate); Judith A. McMorrow, The (F)Utility 
of Rules: Regulating Attorney Conduct in Federal Court Practice, 58 SMU L. REV. 3, 37 (2005) (noting 
that the Restatement took 15 years to complete). 
59  See Susan Mae McCabe, A Brief History of the Paralegal Profession, 86-JUL MICH. B.J. 18, 19 (July, 
2007)(“Currently, California is the only state that requires paralegals to be licensed.”). 
60  Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 6450(b) (“Notwithstanding subdivision (a), a paralegal shall not do the 
following: (1) Provide legal advice.”)  Subsection (a) to section 6450 states that “[t]asks performed by a 
paralegal include, but are not limited to” a list of identified tasks, including “case planning, development, 
and management; legal research; interviewing clients; fact gathering and retrieving information; drafting 
and analyzing legal documents ....”  Subsection (a)’s “including but not limited to” language implies that a 
lawyer may decide in her judgment how to employ a legal assistant, but subsection (b) limits the lawyer’s 
discretion and prohibits delegation of the task of providing client advice. 
61  As we shall see below, the limitation on a nonlawyer’s offering independent legal advice is consistent 
with the thesis offered in this Article, and does not imply a ban on giving to a client advice developed under 
the supervision of and collaboration with a lawyer.  See text accompanying notes  infra. 
62  Supreme Court of the State of New Hampshire, Administrative Rule 35, Guidelines for the Utilization 
by Lawyers of the Services of Legal Assistants under the New Hampshire Rules of Professional Conduct, 
Comment 1 to Rule 5.3, at http://www.courts.state.nh.us/rules/scr/scr-35.htm (last visited February 27, 
2009). 
63  See id.  Administrative Rule 35 refers its reader to Rule 5.3 of the New Hampshire Rules of Professional 
Conduct, which mimics Model Rule 5.3.  See MODEL RULES, supra note  , R. 5.3.  Rule 35 then include its 
own “Comment,” followed by a set of rules within that Comment.  See New Hampshire Supreme Court 
Administrative Rules, supra note  , at R. 35, cmt., R. 1.  Rule 1 states:  
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Governing Paralegal Services of the State Bar of New Mexico state that “[a] paralegal 
shall not ... provide legal advice.”64  Like the California and New Hampshire limitations, 
that prohibition, which appears to have the force of law in New Mexico,65 may only 
apply to unsupervised, independent legal advice.66
 
C. Authority from the Common Law 
 
 No court has held that lawyers cannot delegate certain categories of work to 
nonlawyers.67  Many courts have disciplined lawyers for assisting in the unauthorized 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
It is the responsibility of the lawyer to take all steps reasonably necessary to ensure that a legal 
assistant for whose work the lawyer is responsible does not provide legal advice or otherwise 
engage in the unauthorized practice of law; provided, however, that with adequate lawyer 
supervision the legal assistant may provide information concerning legal matters and otherwise act 
as permitted under these rules. 
 
The word “otherwise” in the phrase “does not provide legal advice or otherwise engage in the unauthorized 
practice of law” implies that this rule is aimed at preventing nonlawyers from providing their own, 
unsupervised advice, and therefore engaging in the practice of law.  The final clause, explicitly allowing 
nonlawyers to communicate legal information (which one infers can include “advice”) to a client, supports 
strongly the reading that a nonlawyer, if supervised by a lawyer and not acting independently, may offer 
legal advice to a client. 
64  State Bar of New Mexico, Rules Governing Paralegal Services, Rule 20-103, at 
http://www.nmbar.org/AboutSBNM/ParalegalDivision/PDrulesgovparalegalservices.html (last visited 
February 28, 2009). 
65  The State Bar of New Mexico is an integrated bar with powers delegated from the Supreme Court of 
New Mexico.  The Board of Bar Commissioners of the State Bar is a “bod[y] of the judicial department ....” 
New Mexico Statutes 1978, 36-2-9.1 (1979).  I infer from that statute that the rules governing the legal 
profession issued by the State Bar are enforceable.  An “integrated bar association” is an “association of 
attorneys in which membership and dues are required as a condition of practicing law in a State.” Keller v. 
State Bar of California, 496 U.S. 1, 3 (1990).  For a discussion of integrated bar associations, see, e.g. 
Elizabeth Chambliss & Bruce A. Green,  Some Realism about Bar Associations, 57 DEPAUL L. REV. 425 
(2008); Bradley A. Smith, The Limits of Compulsory Professionalism: How the Unified Bar Harms the 
Legal Profession, 22 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 35 (1994). 
66  See State Bar of New Mexico, Rules Governing Paralegal Services, supra note  , at Rule 20-103, 
Committee Commentary, which explains the rules “no legal advice” provision as follows: 
 
Some activities which would involve the unauthorized practice of law if undertaken by the 
paralegal include: (a) independently recommending a course of conduct or a particular action to a 
client; (b) evaluating for or speculating with a client on the probable outcome of litigation, 
negotiations or other proposed action; (c) independently outlining rights or obligations to a client; 
and (d) independently interpreting statutes, decisions or legal documents to a client. 
 
The repeated reference to “independently” implies that the nonlawyer may communicate such information 
to a client if not done so independently, but instead done under the supervision and monitoring of a licensed 
lawyer.  See text accompanying notes  infra, for a discussion of the best understanding of a nonlawyer’s 
role in counseling clients. 
67  Consistent with this observation, the ABA Model Guidelines for Utilization of Paralegal Services, in its 
Comment to Guideline 3 (“A Lawyer May Not Delegate to a Paralegal: ... (3) Responsibility for a Legal 
Opinion Rendered to a Client”) does not cite a single court decision or statute to support its seeming ban on 
a nonlawyer offering legal advice.  See MODEL PARALEGAL GUIDELINES, supra note  , at 6-7 (citing certain 
ethics opinions and the court rules of New Hampshire (discussed above), Kentucky (cited by the Guidelines 
inappropriately, as Kentucky’s rule explicitly permits supervised nonlawyers to offer legal advice; see 
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practice of law or similar misconduct by improper delegation of legal tasks to 
nonlawyers,68 in violation of the jurisdiction’s version of Model Rules 5.369 or 5.5(a)70 or 
some similar professional duty in that jurisdiction.  Those courts sometimes include dicta 
indicating that a lawyer cannot delegate certain sensitive tasks, like the provision of legal 
advice, to a nonlawyer.71  But each reported case in which a lawyer found himself or 
herself in trouble as a result of the use of a nonlawyer involved some variation of a 
failure of supervision of the nonlawyer.72  No reported court decision has disciplined a 
lawyer or a nonlawyer for competent, supervised activity by the nonlawyer. 
 
 Courts do say on occasion that lawyers cannot delegate certain categories of work 
to nonlawyers.  For instance, a Louisiana Supreme Court justice, in an opinion disbarring 
a lawyer for assisting in the unauthorized practice of law by inappropriate delegation of 
legal work to a nonlawyer, offered one of the narrowest conceptions of the scope of 
permissible delegation: 
 
[W]e conclude ... that a lawyer may delegate various tasks to ... non-lawyers; that 
he or she may not, however, delegate to any such person the lawyer’s role of 
appearing in court in behalf of a client or of giving legal advice to a client; that he 
or she must supervise closely any such person to whom he or she delegates other 
tasks, including the preparation of a draft of a legal document or the conduct of 
legal research; and that the lawyer must not under any circumstance delegate to 
such person the exercise of the lawyer’s professional judgment in behalf of the 
client or even allow it to be influenced by the non-lawyer’s assistance.73
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Kentucky Bar Association, Rules of the Supreme Court of Kentucky, S.C.R. 3.700, Sub-Rule 2, at 
http://www.kybar.org/documents/scr/scr3/scr_3.700.pdf (last visited February 28, 2009)) and New Mexico 
(discussed above)). 
68  See, e.g., People v. Laden, 893 P.2d 771 (Colo. 1995); People v. Cassidy, 884 P.2d 309 (Colo. 1994) 
(attorney suspended, inter alia, for aiding nonlawyers in preparing and marketing “living trust packages”); 
The Florida Bar v. Abrams, 919 So. 2d 425, 428 (Fla. 2006)(attorney suspended, inter alia, for assisting 
layperson in practice of law); The Florida Bar v. Beach, 675 So. 2d 106 (Fla. 1996) (attorney suspended for 
assisting layperson in practice of law); In re Mopsik, 902 So.2d 991 (La. 2005) (per curiam) (60-day 
suspension for failing to supervise a paralegal's work on a case, at least some of which work constituted the 
unauthorized practice of law); In re Sledge, 859 So.2d 671 (La. 2003) (per curiam) (lawyer disbarred, in 
part, for failure to supervise nonlawyer employees). 
69  MODEL RULES, supra note  , at R. 5.3. 
70  MODEL RULES, supra note  , at R. 5.5(a) (“A lawyer shall not practice law in a jurisdiction in violation 
of the regulation of the legal profession in that jurisdiction, or assist another in doing so.”). 
71  See, e.g., The Florida Bar v. Thomson, 310 So.2d 300 (Fla.1975)(“preparatory nature”) ; Doe v. Condon, 
532 S.E.2d 879 (S.C. 2000)(“answering legal questions would constitute the unauthorized practice of 
law”); Matter of Easler, 275 S.C. 400, 272 S.E.2d 32, 32 (1980)(“limited to work of a preparatory nature”). 
72  See Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, What Constitutes Unauthorized Practice of Law by Paralegal, 109 
A.L.R.5TH 275 (2003 and 2009 Supp.).  A review of the many cases collected in this ALR annotation 
shows no instances where a properly supervised nonlawyer, or the supervising lawyer, faced any sanctions, 
regardless of the type of work performed by the nonlawyer. 
73  Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Edwins, 540 So.2d 294, 300 (La. 1989) (emphasis added). 
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This quote, intended perhaps to communicate a binding standard for Louisiana lawyers,74 
suggests a remarkably narrow scope of permissible delegation of authority from lawyers 
to nonlawyers.  It includes the common prohibition against “giving legal advice to a 
client,” but proceeds to supplement that ban with an edict forbidding lawyers even from 
accepting the influence of the nonlawyers with whom they work.  That order is as 
nonsensical as it is unenforceable.  It is also, fortunately, dictum. 
 
 Like virtually all of the matters reviewed by state courts in this area, the facts of 
the matter before the Louisiana Supreme Court did not even come close to a lawyer 
having delegated supervised activity to a nonlawyer assistant, or accepting some insights 
from the nonlawyer.  The story of Louisiana State Bar Association v. Edwins is one of 
grossly unauthorized practice by a nonlawyer with no supervision by a lawyer, and with a 
heady dose of malpractice thrown in.  Rallie C. Edwins, a Baton Rouge lawyer, agreed to 
take over the business of one Rob Robertson, who had been “operat[ing] a free lance 
paralegal service in New Iberia[, Louisiana] under the name of Prepaid Legal Services, 
Inc.”75  Edwins changed the name of Robertson’s office to his law firm name, but 
retained his own law office in Baton Rouge.  Robertson then independently met a man in 
his New Iberia office who had a personal injury claim, told the man he was a lawyer, 
filed suit in Edwins’s name on the man’s behalf, and soon settled the case for a $1000 net 
payment to the man, without obtaining the man’s informed consent or providing him any 
advance notice of the terms of the settlement.76
 
 Not surprisingly, the Louisiana Supreme Court justice was not amused.  He found 
“an ongoing relationship in which Edwins allowed Robertson to perform legal tasks 
without supervision and to exercise professional judgment properly reserved only for 
attorneys.”77  The justice imposed a sanction of disbarment.78
 
 The Edwins matter, while perhaps a bit extreme in the level of malfeasance and 
lack of supervision, is actually typical of the cases in which courts discuss the limits of 
nonlawyer assistance.  The courts employ language indicating categorical and often 
narrow limits on a lawyer’s discretion to delegate activity to an assistant, but the facts of 
the matters being decided always demonstrate a flagrant absence of supervision and 
oversight.  Ignoring the dicta, then, we can conclude confidently from the common law 
authority the following insight—lawyers may not, on penalty of assisting unauthorized 
practice, delegate unsupervised activity to nonlawyers.  That is the only lesson available 
 
                                                 
74  See id., at 299-300 (“[T]he supreme authority resides in this court to define, by formal rules or by 
adjudication of cases, the acts or courses of conduct which constitute the practice of law. ... In defining the 
practice of law for purposes of interpreting DR 3-101(A) [the disciplinary rule applicable to this matter], 
this court may consider as persuasive, but not binding, pertinent legislative expressions.”).
75  Id., at 297.  Under any relevant legal standard, a nonlawyer offering prepaid legal services would be 
engaged unlawfully in the unauthorized practice of law.  See Florida Bar v. Brumbaugh, 355 So.2d 1186 
(Fla. 1978). 
76  Edwins, supra note  , at 297.  A lawyer may not settle a client’s matter without obtaining the client’s 
informed consent.  See MODEL RULES, supra note  , at R. 1.2(a); RESTATEMENT, supra note  , at §22(1); 
WOLFRAM, supra note  , at . 
77   Edwins, supra note  , at 301. 
78  Id., at 302. 
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from the common law authority.  The lesson tells us nothing about the limits of 
responsible, supervised delegation. 
 
D. Insights from the Attorney-Client Privilege Cases 
 
 While no court has expressly declared (aside from in dictum) that a lawyer may 
not delegate certain categories of legal activity to her nonlawyer assistant, neither has any 
court expressly held that such delegation of the most commonly cited forbidden 
activity—providing legal advice to a client—is in fact proper.  No reported decision 
appears, for instance, where a court has reviewed a disciplinary matter against a lawyer 
charged with assisting unauthorized practice of law by delegating a supervised legal 
counseling task to a nonlawyer, and then proceeded to find the delegation proper.79  On 
that specific question within the realm of professional discipline, no discrete common law 
authority exists on either side of the matter.  Several courts, though, have implicitly 
concluded that a lawyer’s delegation to a nonlawyer of the task of communicating legal 
advice is indeed proper, in cases reviewing claims of privilege. 
 
 In reviewing assertions of attorney-client privilege80 in circumstances involving 
communications between clients and paralegals working for an attorney, several courts 
have concluded that legal advice communicated by a nonlawyer to a client is within the 
scope of the attorney-client privilege if the nonlawyer was acting under the supervision of 
the licensed lawyer.81  Consistent with that principle, courts have denied the claim of 
privilege after concluding that the nonlawyer was acting independent of the lawyer’s 
supervision, and not as an integral part of the lawyer’s provision of legal services.82  In 
both instances, the relevant consideration is whether the nonlawyer was offering 
independent advice unconnected to the lawyer’s work and supervision, or whether the 
nonlawyer’s advice was essentially “a conduit”83 for the lawyer’s judgment.84
 
                                                 
79  See note  supra (noting the lessons from the most comprehensive annotation of nonlawyer unauthorized 
practice of law cases). 
80  The attorney-client privilege is a common law doctrine protecting communications between a lawyer 
and a client made for purposes of obtaining or providing legal assistance.  See 8 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE 
554 §2292 (McNaughton ed. 1961); RESTATEMENT, supra note  , at §§68-82. 
81  See, e.g., Stryker Corp. v. Intermedics Orthopedics, Inc., 145 F.R.D. 298, 305 n. 3 (E.D.N.Y.1992); 
Foseco International Limited v. Fireline, Inc., 546 F.Supp. 22, 25 (N.D.Ohio 1982). 
82  See, e.g., HPD Laboratories, Inc. v. Clorox Co., 202 F.R.D. 410,  (D.N.J., 2001)(paralegal offered her 
own independent counsel); Byrnes v. Empire Blue Cross Blue Shield, No. 98 Civ. 8520, 1999 WL 
1006312, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov.4, 1999) (noting that the privilege does not “cover communications between 
a non-attorney and a client that involve the conveyance of legal advice offered by the non-attorney ...”); ; 
John Labatt Ltd. v. Molson Breweries, 898 F.Supp. 471, 477 (E.D.Mich.1995) (finding privilege 
inapplicable because legal employee did not act as a conduit to and from counsel); United States v. United 
Shoe Machinery Corp., 89 F.Supp. 357, 360-61 (D.Mass.1950) (finding that privilege did not apply to 
patent department employees rendering their own legal and business advice). 
83  See HPD Laboratories, Inc. v. Clorox Co., 202 F.R.D. at ; John Labatt Ltd. v. Molson Breweries, 898 
F.Supp. at 477 (employing the “conduit” concept). 
84  See Occidental Chem. Corp. v. OHM Remediation Servs. Corp., 175 F.R.D. 431, 435 (W.D.N.Y.1997) 
(no privilege absent proof that non-attorney was hired to assist counsel);  Stryker Corp. v. Intermedics 
Orthopedics, Inc., 145 F.R.D. at 305 (“constructive employee” theory);  Nat’l Hockey League Players’ 
Assoc. v. Bettman, 1994 WL 38130, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 1994)(same);  Foseco Intern, Ltd. v. Fireline, 
Inc., 546 F.Supp. 22 (N.D.Ohio 1982)(“direction and control”);  Hercules, Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 434 
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 The courts addressing the privilege question accept that nonlawyers will meet 
with clients and discuss the law.  As one federal District Court judge wrote, “There is 
nothing wrong with Clorox employees [the law firm’s clients] using Ms. Peeff [a law 
firm paralegal] as a legal resource ....”85  If the legal information communicated by the 
nonlawyer represents her transmission of advice crafted with the lawyer’s supervision 
and under the lawyer’s responsibility, the privilege will apply, even if the attorney does 
not speak the words to the client.86  By contrast, if the nonlawyer communicates her own 
independent and unapproved legal advice, the claim of privilege fails.87
 
 Of course, decisions interpreting the scope of the attorney-client privilege are not 
directly dispositive on the questions surrounding the unauthorized practice of law.  They 
do, however, offer constructive support for the proposition that supervised nonlawyers 
may, under the right circumstances, provide legal advice to clients.  The attorney-client 
privilege only applies to communications related to the provision of legal advice.88  The 
case law, as we just saw, holds that a nonlawyer’s communications to a client about legal 
matters will fall within the scope of the privilege if the nonlawyer is supervised by a 
lawyer and is communicating to the client as part of a lawyer’s representation of the 
client.  That common law authority refutes the broad claims from the advisory sources 
and court dicta that nonlawyers may not offer legal advice to a client.  It also permits us 
to understand better the contextual nature of the ban on giving legal advice.  That ban 
only makes sense when applied to entirely independent legal advice, unsupervised by a 
lawyer and reliant entirely on the skill and judgment of the nonlawyer.  A prohibition on 
that activity is a sensible one, assuming again the validity of the unauthorized practice of 
law dogma.89
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
F.Supp. 136, 146 (D.Del.1977)(“working at the direction of and under the supervision of an attorney”); 
Burlington Industr. v. Exxon Corp., 65 F.R.D. 26, 39 (D.Md.1974) (noting that documents prepared at 
lawyer’s direction may be protected); Congoleum Industries, Inc. v. G.A.F. Corp., 49 F.R.D. 82 
(E.D.Pa.1969), aff’d, 478 F.2d 1398 (3 Cir. 1973) (same). 
 Cf. United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238-39 (1975)(work product doctrine “protect[s] 
materials prepared by agents for the attorney”); United States v. Adlman, 68 F.3d 1495, 1499 (2d Cir.1995) 
(recognizing that “the privilege ... can extend to shield communications to others when the purpose of the 
communication is to assist the attorney in rendering advice to the client”); United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 
918 (2d Cir.1961) (same); 2 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE ¶ 
503(a)(3)[01] at 503-26 to 27 (1990)(privilege protects communications to attorney’s agents). 
85  HPD Laboratories, Inc. v. Clorox Co., 202 F.R.D. at  415. 
86  Id. at 416 (privilege applies if the nonlawyers “pass on that attorney's advice to the client,” citing John 
Labatt Ltd., 898 F.Supp. at 477, or “advice formulated ‘under the supervision and at the direction of an 
attorney,’” quoting Byrnes, 1999 WL 1006312 at *4). 
87  “Courts do not, however, safeguard advice that paralegals develop and disseminate on their own.  Cf. 
United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 89 F.Supp. 357, 360-61 (D.Mass.1950) (finding that 
privilege did not apply to patent department employees that rendered their own legal and business advice).”  
HPD Laboratories, Inc. v. Clorox Co., 202 F.R.D. at  416. 
88  See United States v. Ackert, 169 F.3d 136, 139 (2d Cir. 1999)(“the privilege protects communications 
between a client and an attorney, not communications that prove important to an attorney’s legal advice to 
a client.”); NATHAN M. CRYSTAL, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: PROBLEMS OF PRACTICE AND THE 
PROFESSION 265-67 (4th ed. 2008). 
89  See text accompanying note – supra. 
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III. A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR UNDERSTANDING DELEGATION TO 
NONLAWYERS 
 
A. Introduction to and Overview of the Framework 
 
 Up to this point we have seen that much of the advisory authority from bar 
associations and professional associations warns attorneys about categorical limits on 
what tasks they may permissibly and lawfully delegate to the nonlawyers with whom 
they work, and those authorities most often declare that an attorney may not delegate to a 
nonlawyer the responsibility of giving legal advice.  Occasionally, those authorities also 
include negotiation as a non-delegable task.90  We have also seen, though, that there is no 
binding legal authority establishing such a categorical proscription.  No lawyer has ever 
been disciplined or charged criminally, and no nonlawyer has ever been charged 
criminally, for supervised, responsible work performed by a nonlawyer as part of a 
lawyer’s representation.  We may conclude, then, that the state of the law in this area is, 
at best, uncertain and confusing. 
 
 In this part I respond to that uncertainty and confusion.  I propose a conceptual 
framework for guiding lawyers in their delegation decisions.  The framework I will 
describe is fully consistent with the slim available substantive law, and in fact is 
consistent as well with most of the advisory authority, once interpreted through a lens of 
practical lawyering judgment.  The conceptual framework I suggest understands the 
lawyer’s delegation of work to a nonlawyer as essentially a question of risk management, 
appraised by the lawyer’s practical wisdom and subject to her client’s informed consent.  
Understood as such, a practicing attorney could accept comfortably the thesis introduced 
at the beginning of this Article—a thesis that rejects categorical exclusions in favor of a 
discretionary standard governed by professional competence and fiduciary duty of care 
considerations. 
 
 To develop this conceptual framework, I first describe briefly the roles that risk 
management and client-centered decisionmaking play in ordinary lawyering practice, and 
connect those normative constructs to the prevailing understanding of unauthorized 
practice dogma.  I then build upon that understanding to evaluate the activity categories 
which the authorities reviewed above consistently recognize as properly delegable to 
nonlawyers—document drafting, legal research, and fact investigation and client 
interviewing.  Each such permissive activity category, we shall see, obtains its 
justification because of a perceived, underlying risk/benefit assessment supported by an 
assumed or explicit client buy-in.  Having unpacked those permissive categories, we then 
examine one purported forbidden activity, legal counseling.  We shall see that an 
 
                                                 
90  See, e.g.,  Fla. Ethics Op. 74-35 (negotiating with insurance adjusters “always involve[s] the exercise of 
the lawyer's professional judgment”);  THE FLORIDA BAR, FLORIDA ETHICS GUIDE FOR PARALEGALS AND 
ATTORNEYS WHO UTILIZE PARALEGALS, Part III (2006) (“A nonlawyer who engages in negotiations risks 
committing [unauthorized practice of law]”); cf. The Florida Bar v. Neiman, 816 So.2d 587 (Fla. 
2002)(nonlawyer improperly negotiated, but no supervision); State ex rel. Oregon State Bar v. Lenske, 584 
P.2d 759, 764 (1978) (implying negotiation would be improper for a nonlawyer, but no unauthorized 
practice of law because of presence of lawyer). 
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application of the same risk management and informed consent heuristics, with an 
appreciation of the unauthorized practice rationales, would not categorically deny a 
lawyer the opportunity to delegate a counseling task to a properly supervised and talented 
nonlawyer if in the lawyer’s judgment the result would be competent and efficient legal 
work for which the lawyer remains fully responsible. 
 
B. Risk Assessment, Informed Consent, and Unauthorized Practice 
Rationales 
 
 In this Subpart I describe briefly three readily-accepted lawyering conceptions, all 
of which are essential to an understanding of the subject of delegation to nonlawyers. 
 
1) Risk Assessment and Practical Judgment 
 
 Competent lawyering always, and inevitably, involves responsible assessment of 
risk, and appreciation of the cost/benefit probabilities inherent in any course of legal 
activity on a client’s behalf.91  A lawyer representing a client must always exercise her 
professional judgment to discern when she has done enough legal work, what form that 
legal work will take, and when to proceed to the next step in her plan.92  Except in the 
most banal or routine of matters,93 a lawyer can never be certain that her lawyering 
activity will achieve the result she seeks, but she uses her experience and her wisdom to 
proceed in a way that maximizes the likelihood of reaching her goal.94  Exercising sound 
 
                                                 
91  See, e.g., GARY BELLOW & BEA MOULTON, THE LAWYERING PROCESS: MATERIALS FOR CLINICAL 
INSTRUCTION IN ADVOCACY 202-304 (1978)(one of the earliest, and one of the best, explorations of 
strategic planning in lawyering); AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, SECTION OF LEGAL EDUCATION AND 
ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT—AN EDUCATIONAL 
CONTINUUM, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSION: NARROWING THE GAP 
(1992) 141-150 [hereinafter THE MACCRATE REPORT] (discussing “problem solving”); Alexander Scherr, 
Lawyers and Decisions: A Model of Practical Judgment, 47 VILL. L. REV. 161 (2002)(connecting 
lawyering judgment to understanding risk considerations). 
92  See, e.g., ROY STUCKEY ET AL., BEST PRACTICES FOR LEGAL EDUCATION: A VISION AND A ROAD MAP 
149 (2007)(“practical wisdom); WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR 
THE PROFESSION OF LAW 115-20 (2007) (“wisdom of practice”). 
93  One can imagine purely routine, technical legal matters where a lawyer need not exercise judgment in 
order to accomplish a desired result for a client.  As both the legal realists and the critical legal studies 
scholars have taught us, the legal process is seldom that mechanical.  See Scherr, supra note  , at  
(developing the connection between lawyering judgment and the indeterminacy recognized by realists and 
critical legal studies adherents).  For a discussion of realists and CLS thinkers, see Duncan Kennedy, 
Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: A Critical Phenomenology, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 518, 559 (1986) 
(rejecting argument “that the only permissible course of action for a judge confronting a conflict between 
the law and how he wants to come out is always to follow the law”); Benjamin C. Zipursky, Practical 
Positivism Versus Practical Perfectionism: The Hart-Fuller Debate at Fifty, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1170 
(2008)(reviewing the history). 
94  See ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 16 
(1993)(developing the notion of practical wisdom, with in Aristotle’s teachings, as the soul of good 
lawyering); Mark Neal Aaronson, We Ask You to Consider: Learning About Practical Judgment in 
Lawyering, 4 CLINICAL L. REV. 247, 252-56 (1998)(practical judgment); David Luban & Michael 
Millemann, Good Judgment: Ethics Teaching in Dark Times, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 31, 58-64 
(1995)(same). 
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lawyering judgment—with appreciation for and careful calculation of the available 
risks—is the hallmark of wise and competent lawyering.95
 
 Consider the simplest of examples.  Imagine that a client, Barbara, has retained a 
lawyer, Shawn, to represent her in a dispute with a contractor, Jeffrey, who has 
abandoned and not completed the agreed-upon work on her kitchen for which Barbara 
has paid him.  In this straightforward breach of contract matter, Shawn might engage in 
the following tasks:  He would interview Barbara, perform some legal research, develop a 
strategy, contact Jeffrey informally and then formally through a demand letter, file a 
lawsuit in the state trial court, perform discovery and file pretrial motions, negotiate with 
Jeffrey’s lawyer, counsel Barbara about settlement possibilities, and conduct the trial.  
For any one of the tasks just identified, Shawn must make calculated predictions and 
assessments about how to proceed, using his developed lawyering judgments.  In his 
interview, for instance, Shawn might spend an hour with Barbara, asking both open-
ended questions and narrow, focused inquiries.96  He will end the interview without 
knowing for certain whether he has learned everything relevant to the matter at hand.  He 
could interview Barbara for days, asking every question imaginable, but he will not do 
so, even if doing so is objectively safer for his information-gathering goals.97  Similarly, 
he will conduct some research, but after some effort he will stop that task as well, 
believing (but without complete certainty) that he has an adequate grasp of the 
substantive law.  We could repeat this analysis for any one of the tasks on the above 
list.98
 
 The point is that lawyers develop professional, practical judgment which permits 
them to assess and manage risks and uncertainty.99  Clients hire lawyers in large part for 
this talent.  But, at the same time, lawyers facing known risks cannot presume that their 
 
                                                 
95  See Thomas C. Grey, Holmes and Legal Pragmatism, 41 STAN. L. REV. 787, 814 (1989)(pragmatism, 
the intellectual companion to realism, “is the implicit working theory of most good lawyers”); Scherr, 
supra note  , at .  
96  See DAVID A. BINDER, PAUL BERGMAN, SUSAN C. PRICE & PAUL R. TREMBLAY, LAWYERS AS 
COUNSELORS: A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH (2d ed. 2004)[hereafter LAWYERS AS 
COUNSELORS](describing methods of interviewing). 
97  See KENNEY F. HEGLAND, TRIAL AND PRACTICE SKILLS IN A NUTSHELL 32-33 (3rd ed. 2002) (explaining 
the tendency to “fill” when hearing incomplete stories). 
98  Consider one further example of this point.  Shawn might file a motion to compel discovery after 
Jeffrey’s lawyer objects to a request for production of documents.  See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 37 (the federal 
rule permitting such a motion and imposing sanctions for failure to respond to proper discovery).  In his 
choice to file the motion, Shawn engages in a risk/benefit assessment—will the tactic succeed at a 
reasonable cost?  Even his drafting of the motion involves calculation of risk.  He could file a two page 
motion or a four page motion (or, conceivably, a 250 page motion).  He may make certain arguments but 
not others.  He will make those choices by assessing, usually implicitly, the costs and benefits of the 
available choices.  See THOMAS A. MAUET, PRETRIAL 293, §6.15 (5th ed. 2002) (“always consider not 
moving to compel discovery”)(emphasis in original). 
99  See JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Amos Tversky, Paul Slovik & Daniel 
Kahneman eds. 1982)[hereafter JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY]; Susan Bryant & Elliot Milstein,  
Rounds: A “Signature Pedagogy” for Clinical Education?, 14 CLINICAL L. REV. 195, 208 (2007) 
(“professional work involves exercising practical judgments under conditions of uncertainty”). 
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clients’ risk aversion is the same as theirs.100  For this reason, the exercise of lawyering 
judgment is constrained by a powerful factor—the buy-in from the client.  To that topic 
we now turn. 
 
2) Informed Consent 
 
 Lawyers are agents; their clients, principals.  Lawyers act for, and at the behest of, 
their clients.101  While the lawyer develops the intricacies of the strategies and provides 
most of the expertise in lawyering practice, the client ultimately decides the fate of the 
collaborative work, and the course of the representation.102  This statement is both a 
truism and an overstatement.  In light of the preceding discussion about risk 
management,103 it is impossible for a lawyer to include her client in all of the cost/benefit 
decisions she must make on a daily basis.104  But on matters which may be identified as 
representing important risk-driven junctures in a matter, the lawyer ought to ensure that 
the client decides, because it is the client’s comfort with risk that matters, not the 
lawyer’s.105  This recognition is the essence of client-centeredness.106
 
 Lawyers, then, may accept whatever level of risk-taking or risk-aversion the client 
chooses.  Together, the lawyer and client may collaborate about the measures the lawyer 
will take to accomplish the client’s goals, including the cost/benefit assessment of 
delegation of some important tasks to a nonlawyer.  The substantive law of lawyering 
does not limit the lawyer and her client in that collaborative enterprise except in two 
ways.  First, the law prohibits a lawyer from counseling her client to engage in illegal 
conduct, even if the client is willing to take the risk of avoiding detection.107  Second, the 
law prohibits a client, even a sophisticated and fully informed client, to accept the risk of 
 
                                                 
100  See LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS, supra note  , at 7, 296 (suggesting lawyers explore their client’s risk 
aversion scales).  See also JOHN S. HAMMOND, RALPH L. KEENEY & HOWARD RAIFFA, SMART CHOICES: A 
PRACTICAL GUIDE TO MAKING BETTER DECISIONS (1999); THOMAS GILOVICH, HOW WE KNOW WHAT 
ISN'T SO: THE FALLIBILITY OF HUMAN REASON IN EVERYDAY LIFE (1991). 
101  See RESTATEMENT, supra note  , at §16, cmt. b (“A lawyer is a fiduciary”). 
102  MODEL RULES, supra note  , at R. 1.2; RESTATEMENT, supra note  , at §§21, 22.  See William H. Simon, 
Lawyer Advice and Client Autonomy: Mrs. Jones's Case, 50 MD. L. REV. 213, 225 (1991)(examining the 
usual assumptions about client control and autonomy). 
103  See text accompanying note  supra.  
104  See LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS, supra note  , at 275-80; Mark Spiegel, Lawyering and Client 
Decisionmaking: Informed Consent and the Legal Profession, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 41, 43 (1979)(substantive 
decisions must be shared with client). 
105  LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS, supra note  , at 296; see also ROBERT M. BASTRESS & JOSEPH D. 
HARBAUGH, INTERVIEWING COUNSELING AND NEGOTIATING: SKILLS FOR EFFECTIVE REPRESENTATION 26-
27 (1990)(citing CARL ROGERS, CLIENT-CENTERED THERAPY (1951)); ROBERT F. COCHRAN, JOHN M.A. 
DIPIPPA & MARTHA M. PETERS, THE COUNSELOR-AT-LAW: A COLLABORATIVE APPROACH TO CLIENT 
INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING 203-21 (1999); Robert D. Dinerstein, Client-Centered Counseling: 
Reappraisal and Refinement, 32 ARIZ. L. REV. 501 (1990). 
106  See LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS, supra note  , at 7-8; Dinerstein, supra note  , at .  For an insightful 
application of that concept in the context of representation of immigrants, see Christine N. Cimini, Ask, 
Don’t Tell: Ethical Issues Surrounding Undocumented Workers’ Status in Employment Litigation, 61 
STAN. L. REV. 355, 409 (2008). 
107  See MODEL RULES, supra note  , at R. 1.2(d); Stephen L. Pepper, Counseling at the Limits of the Law: 
An Exercise in the Jurisprudence and Ethics of Lawyering, 104 YALE L.J. 1545 (1993). 
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proceeding in her legal case with the representation of a nonlawyer alone.108  That 
paternalistic109 stance forms the basis for the unauthorized practice of law dogma. 
 
3) Unauthorized Practice Rationales 
 
 The final subject we must review briefly to complete the backdrop for the 
nonlawyer delegation framework is that of unauthorized practice of law.  The 
unauthorized practice dogma is premised on a purely prophylactic sentiment—that 
consumers and client will receive the best legal services and the best protection if their 
choice for representation is limited, by law, to members of the bar.110  Its adherents 
would readily accept that the unauthorized practice dogma is overbroad, as all 
prophylactic provisions are.111  In some instances it will be true that some nonlawyer 
would know far better than some lawyer how to proceed to obtain the best results for a 
client.112  In general, though, lawyers will better serve clients, and because it will be 
difficult or even impossible to ascertain which nonlawyers might be better qualified than 
a given lawyer, the policy underlying unauthorized practice dogma insists upon its 
dogmatic, bright line test to assure, as a reliable proposition, the best service to clients.113
 
 Two other realities of the unauthorized practice dogma deserve mention for our 
purposes.  First, it is obvious that the unauthorized practice laws favor lawyers’ 
professional and business interests, and are supported most strongly by the organized 
bar.114  It is an anticompetitive social policy, one that tends to inflate lawyers’ 
incomes.115  Second, unauthorized practice laws manifest a deep trust in lawyers and 
their wise judgments about their own competence.  The dogma’s lack of nuance—its 
explicit assumption that, as a rule, any lawyer will be a better representative of a client 
than any nonlawyer, regardless of the latter’s expertise and experience—imposes upon 
lawyers a fiduciary duty to recognize when they are not competent to accept 
representation of a client.  That manifestation of trust ought to play an important role in 
understanding the proper scope of a lawyer’s delegation discretion. 
 
                                                 
108  See CRYSTAL, supra note  , at 480 (summarizing the unauthorized practice dogma’s argument that “lay 
people are unable to evaluate the competency of nonlawyers”). 
109  See Rhode, Policing the Professional Monopoly, supra note  , at 98-99 (unauthorized practice as 
“paternalism”);  Jonathan Rose, Unauthorized Practice of Law in Arizona: A Legal and Political Problem 
that Won't Go Away, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 585, 600 (2002) (policy is “paternal”);  
110  CRYSTAL, supra note  , at 480; RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE, supra note  , at . 
111  The unauthorized practice dogma is an example of the use of a rule, with clear dividing lines, instead of 
a standard, with discretion available.  The rules/standards dichotomy is a long-standing one in legal 
regimes.  See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 571 
(1992); Pierre J. Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379 (1985). 
112  See Thomas R. Andrews, Nonlawyers in the Business of Law: Does the One Who Has the Gold Really 
Make the Rules? 40 HASTINGS L.J. 577, 621 (1989)(unauthorized practice rules as “prophylactic”); Judith 
L. Maute, Pre-Paid and Group Legal Services: Thirty Years After the Storm, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 915, 
929 (2001) (noting unauthorized practice doctrine as “prophylactic”). 
113  Andrews, supra note  , at ; Margulies, supra note  , at ; Maute, supra note  , at . 
114  See Rhode, Professionalism in Perspective, supra note  , at 711-12; WOLFRAM, supra note  , at 833-34. 
115  See Nathan M. Crystal, Core Values: False and True, 70 FORDHAM L. REV 747, 764-65 (2001)(noting 
that the ABA has ignored the suggestions of its Commission on Nonlawyer Practice); Deborah Rhode, The 
Delivery of Legal Services by Non-lawyers, 4 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 209, 232-33 (1990). 
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C. The Nonlawyer Delegation Framework as an Alchemy of Risk 
Management, Informed Consent, and Unauthorized Practice Prophylaxis 
 
1) The Alchemy 
 
 Consideration of the three factors I have just examined establishes that lawyers 
ought to have discretion to delegate to nonlawyers any tasks which, in the lawyer’s 
professional judgment and subject to the informed consent of the client, will provide the 
best and most efficient legal services to the client.  Any substantive law constraint 
depriving a lawyer of the discretion to delegate certain categories of activity would be 
inconsistent with the practice philosophies accepted within the legal profession.  The 
lawyer discretion model builds upon the trust that lawyers will recognize competence 
gaps and will manage risk responsibly, and only if the lawyer’s client has bought in to 
any significant risk-taking.  For reasons of economy and efficiency, a client is likely to 
buy in if the lawyer oversees the delegation and vouches for its soundness. 
 
 A lawyer who elects to use a nonlawyer assistant to complete some legal tasks 
frequently does so for the benefit of the client.  Any task assigned to a nonlawyer 
assistant could, of course, be performed by the lawyer, but at a higher price.  The use of 
nonlawyers provides a more efficient delivery of legal services at a lower price than if the 
lawyer acted alone;116 the resort to the use of nonlawyer services is thus financially 
adverse to the lawyer’s interests.  A client might prefer that arrangement for the same 
reasons that a client might prefer to hire a lay advocate instead of a lawyer in order to 
save money;117 in this instance, contrary to the request for a lay advocate, the law permits 
a client to make that choice, because the client has a lawyer available to monitor the 
work.  The lawyer will only choose to employ the nonlawyer assistance when it makes 
sense for the client’s case, given the client’s economic needs and the client’s risk 
aversion.118  A client will only agree to nonlawyer assistance when he trusts the lawyer’s 
 
                                                 
116  Of course, a lawyer cannot charge a client her hourly rate for work performed by a nonlawyer (although 
some have been caught doing so).  See Lisa G. Lerman, Lying to Clients, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 659 (1990); 
Douglas R. Richmond, For a Few Dollars More: The Perplexing Problems of Unethical Billing Practices 
by Lawyers, 60 S.C. L. REV. 63 (2008); William G. Ross, The Ethics of Hourly Billing by Attorneys, 44 
RUTGERS L. REV. 1 (1991). 
117  See Rhode, Policing the Professional Monopoly, supra note  , at . 
118  In some instances, a lawyer may benefit financially by her use of the nonlawyer’s assistance, if she is 
offering services at a flat rate and not through a billable hour arrangement.  For a sampling of the critique 
of hourly billing, see, e.g., Susan Saab Fortney, Professional Challenges in Large Firm Practices Article 
The Billable Hours Derby: Empirical Data On The Problems And Pressure Points, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 
171 (2005); Lawrence J. Fox, End Billable Hour Goals ... Now, 17 No. 3 PROF. LAW. 1  (2006); Lerman, 
supra note  , at ; Richmond, supra note  , at ; Ross, supra note  , at .  In those settings, the lawyer and her 
firm benefit if much of the work is performed by lower-priced nonlawyers.  That apparent conflict of 
interest is mitigated by two factors, however.  First, a lawyer ought to obtain the informed consent of the 
client before delegating any substantial tasks to a nonlawyer.  See LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS, supra note  , 
at 275-80 (arguing that clients control all substantive decisions in the representation); Spiegel, supra note  , 
at 43 (same).  Second, because the lawyer remains responsible for the ultimate product and must achieve 
competent work, the lawyer has little or no incentive to exploit any seeming conflict by employing shoddy, 
cheap labor. 
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judgment, accepts the risk, and welcomes the cost savings.  The unauthorized practice 
dogma has no complaint, both because the nonlawyer’s work will be evaluated and 
monitored in accordance with the lawyer’s professional judgment (which the dogma 
trusts), and because the scheme does not present anticompetitive threats to the legal 
profession. 
 
 We thus envision the following confluence:  A lawyer who, against her economic 
interests perhaps, opts to generate a more efficient work product by the judicious 
delegation of tasks to a competent nonlawyer; and a client who, understanding the 
fiduciary responsibility of his lawyer to protect his interests and desirous to obtain the 
most inexpensively responsible legal services from the lawyer and her firm, accepts his 
lawyer’s delegation of tasks to the supervised nonlawyer; and the legal profession which, 
trusting the lawyer’s judgment and fearing little anticompetitive threat from the use of 
nonlawyers, sees no basis to ban the concept of delegation.  Those collective actors with 
those overlapping interests ought to support a lawyer’s delegation authority and 
discretion.  Those actors would be challenged to justify a categorical ban preventing a 
lawyer from choosing to delegate certain selected tasks. 
 
2) A Taxonomy: Drafting, Legal Research, Fact Investigation, Legal 
Counseling 
 
 A nonlawyer employed by a lawyer to assist in her practice performs important 
tasks which the lawyer, because of her delegation to the nonlawyer, will not perform 
herself.  I refer to the tasks as important because they are essentially that—without those 
tasks, the lawyering would not achieve its ends, or would be incomplete.119  Someone 
must perform those tasks; in the settings we are exploring, it is the nonlawyer, and not the 
lawyer, who performs them.  The lawyer of course must supervise the performance of the 
tasks by the nonlawyer, but supervision cannot mean, and does not mean, that she must 
accompany the nonlawyer and observe his performance of the tasks.  No reasonable 
understanding of supervision contemplates that close monitoring, and any such proposal 
would be an absurd understanding of the use of legal assistants.  Nor must the lawyer 
repeat the work of the nonlawyer to ensure its accuracy or soundness, for the same 
obvious reasons. 
 
 Supervision, then, will mean something different from constant monitoring or 
replicating the nonlawyer’s work.  If supervision has any substantive meaning, it must 
mean that the lawyer, who is the only person on the team who may orchestrate the 
lawyering work in its final form, must be confident, within the realm of reason,120 that 
 
                                                 
119  See, e.g., Pincay v. Andrews, 351 F.3d 947 (9th Cir. 2003), reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated, 367 
F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2004)(“the delegation of [attending to court deadlines] to specialized, well-educated 
non-lawyers may well ensure greater accuracy in meeting deadlines than a practice of having each lawyer 
in a large firm calculate each filing deadline anew”). 
120  The use of non-lawyers within law firms invites inevitable risk, risk that the practice schemes accept as 
a worthwhile compromise, if only because of the cost effectiveness of using non-lawyers instead of lawyers 
for certain tasks.  See, e.g., In re Opinion No. 24 of Committee on Unauthorized Practice of Law, 607 A.2d 
962, 966 (N.J. 1992)(noting the importance of paralegal use in saving clients money). 
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the nonlawyer has gotten the task right.  Consider four examples of tasks which a lawyer 
might choose to delegate to a nonlawyer:  drafting motions; performing legal research; 
performing factual research; and advising clients about the state of the law and the 
options available to them.  As we have seen above,121 the advisory authority often 
sanctions a lawyer’s delegation of the first of these three, but often prohibits a lawyer 
from delegating the last, the offering of legal advice.  A comparison of these four tasks 
will help us to understand the function, and the limitations, of the concept of 
“supervision.”  It will also show us that acceptance of the propriety of the first three 
activities’ delegation requires acceptance of the propriety of the last activity’s delegation. 
 
a)  Document drafting 
 
The first example, that of drafting a legal document such as a pleading, might 
serve as an easy beginning example.  It is a task categorically permitted to be delegated to 
a nonlawyer by virtually all authorities,122 and its acceptability may be understood by 
reference to the risk assessment heuristic.  Consider, then, a lawyer who delegates to a 
nonlawyer the task of drafting a standard motion using templates available within the law 
firm.  The lawyer will be able to evaluate with a high degree of confidence whether the 
resulting product reads properly and includes the language, the clarity, and the elements 
necessary for the motion to achieve its purpose.  The lawyer likely saves time by 
delegating the task to a nonlawyer, but the quality of the resulting work may be perfectly 
evaluated by the lawyer.  The risk management by the lawyer is cabined and easily 
assessed. 
 
For other documents, however, the risks of delegation may be more pronounced 
or unclear.  A lawyer who delegates to a nonlawyer to choose among a selection of 
sample templates, or perhaps to create a first draft of a pleading without employing any 
template, may not be able to assess with the same level of confidence whether the 
resulting document achieves its purpose as well as if the lawyer had drafted the pleading 
herself.  Nevertheless, some lawyers might ask a nonlawyer to create such a document in 
an exercise of her lawyering judgment, to save time for the lawyer and money for the 
client.  The lawyer will accept some small possibility that the resulting work will fail to 
achieve its purposes, but that risk assumption is an ongoing enterprise for the lawyer.123
 
                                                 
121  See text accompanying note  supra.  
122  See, e.g., Ct. Bar. Ass’n., Guidelines for Lawyers Who Employ or Retain Legal Assistants, at 
http://www.ctbar.org/article/view/197/1/57 (last visited March 7, 2009) [hereinafter “Ct. Bar. 
Guidelines”](“drafting legal documents” permitted); S.C. Bar Ethics Adv. Comm., Op. 02-12 
(2002)(“composition of legal documents”); Utah St. Bar Ethics Advisory Op. Comm., Op. 99-02 
(1999)(“nonlawyers may perform a wide array of services, including ... drafting documents or pleadings”).  
No court has ever suggested that nonlawyers may not draft documents, except when the drafting occurs 
without lawyer oversight.  See, e.g., United Sates v. Hardy, 681 F.Supp. 1326 (N.D.Ill.1988) (drafting 
simple documents that require some degree of legal knowledge is practice of law); Lynch v. Cannatella, 
122 F.R.D. 195, 198-99 (E.D.La.1987) (attorney could not allow a legal secretary to prepare, sign, and file 
an amended complaint), aff'd, 860 F.2d 651 (5th Cir.1988). 
123  Drafting tasks are the easiest assignments to justify using the risk assessment benchmark, because the 
lawyer supervising the assignment sees the complete product generated by the nonlawyer.  The risks still 
exist, though, in at least two ways.  First, by not drafting the pleading herself, the lawyer’s thought process 
has changed, and she may miss in reviewing a completed document some considerations she would have 
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b)  Legal research 
 
Contrast the motion drafting task with the next example—performing legal 
research, another task categorically permitted by the advisory authorities.124  For legal 
research, the lawyer’s confidence in the resulting work product may be high (the results 
can fit comfortably within the lawyer’s understanding of the substantive law as she has 
understood it), but it simply cannot be as high as in the first motion example above.  If 
the lawyer’s case requires legal research, a task for which the client will be charged and 
which the lawyering responsibilities require, the necessary assumption is that the lawyer 
does not know for sure what the law is without looking it up.  Few lawyers know the law 
perfectly without looking it up, and even those few do so only in narrow and frequently 
repeated contexts.125  When a nonlawyer performs legal research, then, the supervision 
by the lawyer means that the lawyer uses her best legal judgment—the legal judgment 
she has acquired by her membership in the profession and her practice experience—that 
the results of the research as reported by the nonlawyer are sufficiently reliable that the 
lawyer may use the results in moving ahead with her strategic development, advocacy, 
and negotiation.  Like with the drafting task, the ultimate question for the lawyer is 
whether the quality of the work product is sufficiently high to permit her to use it in her 
ongoing work. 
 
c) Fact investigation 
 
 The next example—factual research—demonstrates a potentially higher level of 
risk, but risk whose magnitude the lawyer might reasonably assess and account for in her 
work.  Once again, performing fact investigation, and interviewing clients, are 
responsibilities regularly understood as permissible activities for a lawyer to delegate to 
her nonlawyer colleagues.126  For fact investigation, the lawyer’s confidence in the 
resulting product must necessarily be less than in either of the first two examples just 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
discerned if she engaged in the creative drafting herself.  See Linda L. Berger, Applying the New Rhetoric 
to Legal Discourse: The Ebb and Flow of Reader and Writer, Text and Context, 49 J. LEGAL EDUC. 155 
(1999)(“writing is a process for constructing thought”); Philip C. Kissam, Thinking (By Writing) About 
Legal Writing, 40 VAND. L. REV. 135 (1987); Teresa G J. Christopher Rideout & Jill J. Ramsfield, Legal 
Writing: A Revised View, 69 WASH. L. REV. 35, 45 (1994)(“writing is an integral part of thinking and 
cognitive development”).  Second, drafting is essentially entwined with legal research; the drafter creates 
with a legal theory in mind, and ensures that the pleading sufficiently satisfies the elements of that theory.  
See MARILYN J. BERGER ET AL., PRETRIAL ADVOCACY: PLANNING, ANALYSIS, AND STRATEGY 161 
(2007)(“strategic pleading” as a “goal-oriented approach”).  Since legal research is a riskier endeavor, as 
we see immediately below, drafting shares some of the peril accompanying the delegation of research. 
124  See, e.g., Ky. Bar Ass’n, Ethics Op. KBA E-12 (1976)(“legal research” permitted); Utah St. Bar Ethics 
Advisory Op. Comm., Op. 99-02 (1999)(“nonlawyers may perform a wide array of services, including ... 
conducting legal research”); Matter of Easler, 272 S.E.2d 32, 32 (1980)(“legal research” permitted). 
125  Some lawyers qualify as legal specialists, usually under a state certification scheme.  For a discussion of 
the specialization issue, see RHODE & LUBAN, supra note  , at 795-96; see also Peel v. Attorney Reg. & 
Disc. Comm., 496 U.S. 91 (1990)(lawyer had first amendment right to advertise as specialist). 
126  See, e.g., Matter of Easler, 272 S.E.2d 32, 32 (1980).  Indeed, some texts train nonlawyers how to 
engage in fact investigation.  See, e.g., ELLEN J. WOLTER ET AL., FACTFINDING ON A SHOESTRING FOR THE 
PARALEGAL: INVESTIGATIVE TECHNIQUES FOR GATHERING INFORMATION (Mass. CLE 1996). 
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described.  While some of the nonlawyer’s factual research may produce 
uncontrovertibly reliable results—a witness statement notarized by the witness, for 
instance, or a certified copy of a publicly recorded document127—not all factual research 
permitted to be performed by nonlawyers would satisfy that description.  The lawyer 
might reasonably rely, using her legal and professional judgment, on the reports of her 
investigators and other nonlawyer staff about events, accounts, observations, medical 
histories, etc., when she develops her strategy and completes her final lawyering 
activity.128
 
 Like with each example discussed here, the lawyer’s performance herself of the 
tasks would decrease the risk of distortion or error or sloppiness, but her performance 
would increase, and perhaps dramatically so, the cost of her services.  The lawyer, her 
clients, and the legal profession have opted to accept this minimal additional risk in 
return for the benefits of cost saving and efficiency.  They do so, it is safe to assume, 
because the resulting risk from the delegation is extremely small, because of the oversight 
and supervision of the experienced lawyer with judgment to guide her assessments.129
 
 In each of the examples described so far (drafting, legal research, and fact 
investigation), the nonlawyer’s work could possibly be wrong.  The nonlawyer’s drafting 
of a motion might omit a critical element of the motion’s argument, leaving it fatally 
flawed.130  The nonlawyer’s legal research could overlook a critical new development 
 
                                                 
127  Even in these most safe examples, the lawyer’s delegation of a task to a nonlawyer involves an added 
element of risk, since the lawyer has not obtained the resulting papers herself.  The nonlawyer may have 
forged the witness document, or the witness may not be who he claims to be.  Such risks are extremely 
unlikely, of course, but nevertheless represent an inevitable element of delegation, and that, indeed, is the 
point of this entire discussion. 
128  A lawyer who understands that she has authority to assign, say, a document preparation task to a 
nonlawyer must nevertheless exercise judgment and discretion about what documents to assign the 
nonlawyer to prepare, given the importance, complexity and subtlety of the document and the skill and 
experience of the nonlawyer.  So, for example, a lawyer may ask an experienced real estate paralegal to 
prepare a HUD-1 settlement statement as part of an uncomplicated residential real estate closing, 
understanding that the experienced paralegal is very likely to fill the form our correctly. See, e.g., 
Committees of the Florida Bar, 80-JUN Fla. B.J. 30 (2006)(“many real estate practitioners rely on  
paralegals and computer software to complete certain real estate documents and settlement statements”).  
The same lawyer ought not, and would not, ask a volunteer college student intern to draft a Petition for 
Certiorari to the United States Supreme Court on a deeply complicated antitrust dispute.  The concept of 
“document preparation,” therefore, does not offer any helpful answer to the question about the propriety of 
assignment of tasks to a nonlawyer.  The only true consideration is an assessment of the risks and benefits 
to the client of the assignment, and the combined likelihood of the nonlawyer being wrong and the case or 
matter suffering as a result. 
129  Note that this understanding of the use of nonlawyers as a risk-management device is not only 
applicable to the lawyer’s delegation choices.  Same kind of risk/benefit assessment occurs on a daily basis 
within the lawyer’s own work and her own practice.  Even without using assistants, at some point in her 
work the lawyer finds herself satisfied that she has completed enough factual and legal research, enough 
redrafting of documents, enough consulting with experts, to proceed to a final product for her client.  She 
always could spend more time at greater cost to the client, but she exercises her judgments about when to 
stop.  That same set of heuristics operates in her assessment of the reliability of her assistants’ 
contributions. 
130  It is a tricky analytical question—but perhaps an irrelevant one for our purposes—whether the faulty 
motion ought to be considered a drafting error or a legal research error.  We noted above that the lawyer 
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eviscerating the strength of the authorities located and reported to the lawyer.  The 
nonlawyer’s factual research might be sloppy, incomplete or distorted for any number of 
reasons.131  Of course, a lawyer’s performance of any of those very same tasks could also 
be wrong, although the odds of that happening are seemingly lower than in the case of the 
nonlawyer’s work, especially if we accept (as we do for the sake of this Article) the 
premises of the unauthorized practice dogma.132  The lawyer’s supervision of the 
nonlawyer’s work decreases the risk of error, but it cannot eliminate it. 
 
 Clients, though, should and in fact do accept the just-described use of nonlawyers 
as a reasonable trade-off which will reduce the cost of legal services with minimal effect 
on the quality of the services rendered.  In assessing the wisdom of a lawyer’s use of 
nonlawyer services to assist in her work for her clients, that matrix is the ultimate 
standard by which the profession ought to evaluate this scheme—is a client sufficiently 
protected by the lawyer’s delegation of some tasks to others?  Put another way, should 
the profession permit a client to elect to retain a lawyer who will delegate some of her 
tasks to supervised nonlawyers?  So long as the lawyer, exercising her judgment about 
the complicated practice world in which she operates and accepting the ultimate 
responsibility for the results of the risks involved, concludes that the work performed by 
the nonlawyer is reasonably close to what the lawyer would achieve at a significantly 
higher cost to the client, then the profession ought to permit an informed client to accept 
those minimal risks.  It is, in other words, a sensible thing for the profession to allow, and 
for an informed and understanding client to choose.133
 
                                                                                                                                                 
reviewing the final product of the motion should recognize drafting mistakes, but may not recognize 
research errors, if the reason for the research in the first place was the lawyer’s need to learn some part of 
the law that she did not already know by rote memory. 
131  The behavioral economists teach us that observations and understandings are seldom “objective” and 
value neutral.  Individuals are subject to a wide range of biases and “cognitive illusions” which distort their 
perceptions.  See, e.g., DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL: THE HIDDEN FORCES THAT SHAPE OUR 
DECISIONS (2008);  MAX H. BAZERMAN, JUDGMENT IN MANAGERIAL DECISION MAKING (5th ed. 2002).  
Because lawyers are equally subject to the same cognitive processes and biases, it is an intriguing question 
whether a lawyer would be more or less capable of approaching an “objective,” undistorted understanding 
of factual issues compared to a lawyer’s assistant.  See, e.g., Linda Babcock, Henry S. Farber, Cynthia 
Fobia & Eldar Shafir, Forming Beliefs about Adjudicated Outcomes: Perceptions of Risk and Reservation 
Values, 15 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 289, 293-94 (1995)(negotiators reach very different assessments about 
the value of a case when given identical information); Linda Babcock, George Loewenstein & Samuel 
Issacharoff, Creating Convergences: Debiasing Biased Litigants, 22 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 913 
(1997)((showing plausible debiasing efforts). 
132  See text accompanying notes  supra. 
133  Note here an apparent underlying construct—that a client could choose, and lawyer seemingly would be 
bound by that choice, to pay a lawyer her higher billing rate to perform all of the tasks the lawyer might 
otherwise delegate to a non-lawyer.  This construct treats the use of a non-lawyer assistant as a lawyering 
option for which the client must provide informed consent.  While that construct makes powerful sense 
conceptually (see, e.g., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS, supra note  , at 296 (describing an orientation in which 
most substantive decisions remain for the client to decide)), it does not appear in the literature addressing 
the professional ethics of legal assistants or of lawyers using legal assistants.  See, e.g., MODEL PARALEGAL 
GUIDELINES, supra note  , at (no suggestion of informed consent to use of nonlawyer); MODEL RULES, 
supra note  , at R. 5.3 (no suggestion that use of nonlawyer is negotiable with client). 
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d)  Legal advising and counseling—a categorical exclusion? 
 
 We now reach our fourth example, that of providing legal advice to a client, the 
assignment most frequently identified by the advisory authorities as nondelegable.134  If 
the advisory authorities’ description of the lawyer’s duties is accurate, and if we accept a 
literal and not a nuanced interpretation of that description, then lawyers possess no 
discretion to delegate to a nonlawyer the task of providing to a client some legal advice, 
while possessing lawful discretion to delegate to the nonlawyer the responsibilities of 
drafting documents, performing legal research, and conducting fact investigation.  We 
saw above that the literal reading of that prohibition was not supported by any fair 
reading of available substantive law.135  We see here why any such literal reading would 
be incoherent.  Applying the same matrix of risk management, informed consent and 
unauthorized practice prophylaxis, we see lawyers must possess the same discretion to 
delegate to a supervised nonlawyer the assignment of providing some legal advice. 
 
 Lawyers who assign document preparation, legal research, and fact investigation 
tasks to nonlawyers risk malpractice if the nonlawyers perform the tasks 
incompetently.136  Because any performer of legal services, lawyer or nonlawyer, risks 
committing malpractice if her work happens to be sloppy of in error, the question for the 
lawyer remains one of assessment of the acceptable level of risk, and accepting 
responsibility to indemnify the harmed client if errors occur and result in malpractice 
damages.137
 
 The difficulty with applying a categorical test which would bar lawyers from 
delegating to a nonlawyer discrete lawyering activities like “counseling” is apparent.  The 
underlying justifications for use of nonlawyers as part of an efficient, client-centered law 
practice apply equally as well to some forms of counseling as they do to some forms of 
document preparation, legal research or fact development.  To understand why, we return 
to the concept of supervision.  All nonlawyer work must be properly supervised, 
whatever its nature.138  The critical question is what constitutes effective supervision.139
 
                                                 
134  See, e.g.,  MODEL PARALEGAL GUIDELINES, supra note  , at ; NALA CODE OF ETHICS , supra note  , at ; 
Ct. Bar. Guidelines, supra note  (“legal advice may not be given” during client interviews); S.C. Bar Ethics 
Adv. Comm., Op. 02-12 (2002)(“well settled that a paralegal may not give legal advice”); Doe v. Condon, 
532 S.E.2d 879 (S.C. 2000)(“answering legal questions would constitute the unauthorized practice of 
law”). 
135  See text accompanying note  supra.  
136  See, e.g., Christine Beck Lissitzyn, What’s in a Name? Should Paralegals be Liable for Legal 
Malpractice?, 77 CONN. B. J. 86 (2003), 15 No. 4 PROF. LAW. 2 (2005)(describing when the lawyer, and 
when the nonlawyer, would be liable for malpractice damages to an injured client); VLT, Inc. v. Lucent 
Technologies, Inc., 54 Fed.R.Serv.3d 1319, 2003 WL 151399 (D. Mass. 2003)(paralegal’s mistake waives 
privilege); Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 190 F.R.D. 287 (D.Mass. 2000)(same). 
137  See RESTATEMENT, supra note  , at §49; WOLFRAM, supra note  , at 206-26; Lissitzyn, supra note  , at . 
138  RESTATEMENT, supra note  , at §4. 
139  Supervision is central to the role of clinical legal education, and has received much attention in that 
realm.  See, e.g., Gerald J. Clark, Supervising Judicial Interns: A Primer, 36 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 681 
(2003); Gundlach, supra note ; Richard K. Neumann, Jr., Donald Schon, The Reflective Practitioner, and 
the Comparative Failures of Legal Education, 6 CLIN. L. REV. 401, 414 (2000), William P. Quigley, 
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 As we noted above,140 supervision of a subordinate, whether a lawyer or a 
nonlawyer, cannot mean and does not mean that the supervising lawyer must observe 
every action the supervisee takes.141  It cannot mean and does not mean that the 
supervising lawyer must reprise the work performed by the supervisee, to ensure its 
accuracy.142  Instead, a practical understanding of supervision shows it to consist of 
measures by the lawyer which offer assurance that the delegated work will be performed 
competently.143  It is a risk management concept—it cannot guarantee competent service, 
any more than the lawyer’s doing the work herself could guarantee that result.144
 
 A lawyer may delegate to a nonlawyer the responsibility to communicate legal 
advice to a client in the same manner, and employing the same risk management and 
supervision skills, as the lawyer would delegate a legal research or document drafting 
task.  A lawyer who knows that her nonlawyer colleague—assume, for the moment, an 
experienced lateral who is not a member of the bar and is not practicing “temporarily” in 
the state145—understands a client’s legal issues with depth and sophistication and can 
discuss those issues with clarity and nuance can, consistent with the lawyer’s fiduciary 
duties to her client, suggest that the nonlawyer meet with the client and advise the client 
about his rights.  That delegation would be an essential part of the lawyer’s representation 
of the client, for which the lawyer would remain ultimately responsible.  The client would 
understand that the advice has been communicated by a nonlawyer, and by implication 
(or perhaps expressly so) consents to the use of a less expensive device to further the 
client’s case.146  No unauthorized practice of law worry results, both because the client is 
the beneficiary of the purported special skill of the lawyer147 and because the nonlawyer 
presents no threat to the lawyer’s livelihood, since the lawyer has full control over the use 
of that practice option.148
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Introduction to Clinical Teaching for the New Clinical Law Professor: A View from the First Floor, 28 
AKRON L. REV. 463, 477-481 (1995). 
140  See text accompanying note  supra.  
141  The cases where a court determines that delegation was proper tend to involve fee disputes.  See, e.g., 
Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274 (1989); In re Jastrem, 224 B.R. 125, 131 (Bkrtcy. E.D. Cal. 
1998)(paralegal fees appropriate).  See also In re Opinion No. 24 of Committee on Unauthorized Practice 
of Law, 607 A.2d 962, 966 (N.J. 1992)(acknowledging the many proper tasks for nonlawyer assistance to 
lawyers). 
142  MODEL PARALEGAL GUIDELINES, supra note , at 4, Guideline 2, Comments (lawyer must provide 
adequate instruction and monitor progress); Opinion No. 24, supra, at 969 (affirming practice of using 
“independent paralegals” not employed by a law firm). 
143  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.05(1), cmt. d (2006) (responsible supervision a function of 
risks to third parties and burdens of precautions). 
144  I use the term “guarantee” to mean that the lawyer will be absolutely certain that no mistakes will be 
made.  If we understood “guarantee” to mean an indemnification or compensation if the resulting work is 
not competent, then in both scenarios in the text the lawyer would “guarantee” the result. 
145  See MODEL RULES, supra note  , at R. 5.5(c)(1) and cmts. [6] and [8] (permitting an out of state lawyer 
to practice in the jurisdiction temporarily if associated with a lawyer who is licensed). 
146  See text accompanying note  supra (discussing the informed consent component of the conceptual 
framework). 
147  See CRYSTAL, supra note  , at  (noting that professed underpinning of unauthorized practice rules). 
148  See RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE, supra note  , at  (noting the importance of that threat to the 
unauthorized practice dogma). 
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 Recall that a nuanced reading of the seeming categorical ban on nonlawyer’s 
offering legal advice supports this conclusion.149  The authorities which repeat that 
generalized prohibition often qualify it with some version of the “conduit” notion,150 
approving a nonlawyer’s communication to the client of the lawyer’s ideas.151  It is 
critical, however, not to read the conduit conception in too crabbed and narrow a fashion.  
The narrow conduit version would approve a nonlawyer’s providing legal advice only as 
a script reader, one who has heard the lawyer’s legal conclusions and transmits those 
ideas to the client by rote.  By that understanding, a reasonably talented high school 
intern could accomplish that task. 
 
 A more sensible, and in fact the only sensible, understanding of the conduit idea 
goes much farther than the script reading function.  The better understanding approves of 
the nonlawyer’s engaging the client in a spirited dialogue about the client’s legal rights 
and duties, so long as the lawyer is confident that the nonlawyer may perform that task 
competently and effectively.152  The assistant still serves as a “conduit” for the lawyer’s 
judgment and her skill at reading complexity and nuance.  Because the lawyer is certain 
that the nonlawyer has the ability to manage the interaction, that judgment (and that risk 
assessment) controls.  The lawyer is using the nonlawyer as one useful component of her 
lawyering toolkit.153
 
 The richer conduit conception just described suggests some possible limits, 
however.  Its trusting of the lawyer’s assessment about the nonlawyer’s skill might imply 
more liberty on the part of the lawyer than even an expansive reading of the unauthorized 
practice of law dogma would tolerate.  For instance, a lawyer might accurately trust her 
nonlawyer colleague’s abilities so much (imagine, again, an experienced lateral associate) 
that the lawyer would confidently choose to assign the nonlawyer to handle a client’s 
matter from beginning to end without any oversight by the lawyer at all—indeed, the 
lawyer may never even know of the client’s existence, except perhaps to approve 
formally the creation of an attorney-client relationship with the law firm.154  By all of the 
criteria we have employed above—the risk management responsibilities of the lawyer, 
the informed consent of the client (who, we may assume, has assented to the nonlawyer’s 
 
                                                 
149  See text accompanying note  supra.  
150  See HPD Laboratories, Inc. v. Clorox Co., 202 F.R.D. 410, 415 (D.N.J. 2001)(approving the conduit 
metaphor); John Labatt Ltd. v. Molson Breweries, 898 F.Supp. 471, 477 (E.D.Mich.1995)(same); The 
Florida Bar v. Beach, 675 So. 2d 106, 109 (Fla. 1996) )(nonlawyer a “conduit” for the lawyer, but without 
supervision; lawyer suspended). 
151  See, e.g. MODEL PARALEGAL GUIDELINES, supra note  , at ; NH Rule 35, supra note (“with adequate 
lawyer supervision the legal assistant may provide information concerning legal matters”). 
152  See Chavkin, supra note , at .  While Chavkin applies his arguments to students who are provisionally 
licensed to practice law under a state’s student practice rule, his insights have relevance to nonlawyers to 
whom lawyers delegate tasks as part of the lawyer’s practice.  See also Bryant & Milstein, supra note  , at 
208 (noting the importance of students’ abilities to exercise judgment amidst uncertainty). 
153  Cf. Daniel A. Farber, The Supreme Court, the Law of Nations, and Citations of Foreign Law: The 
Lessons of History, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1335, 1348 (2007)(“foreign and international law” serve as “part of 
the lawyer’s toolkit”); McGowan, supra note  , at 1094 (“rational actor game-theoretic analysis ... is 
fundamental to a lawyer’s analytical toolkit”). 
154  See RESTATEMENT, supra note , at .  See text accompanying notes  infra (discussing this concept). 
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role), and the unauthorized practice prophylaxis—that arrangement should pass muster.  
Given the lawyer’s ultimate responsibility and her judgment about the depth and breadth 
of the nonlawyer’s talent, there is no conceptual difference between that delegation and 
the lawyer’s assigning the nonlawyer to draft a pleading.  Nevertheless, despite the logic 
of this proposition, a lawyer using her nonlawyer assistant in this way proceeds at her 
peril.155
 
 We now see that a categorical exclusion of “counseling” or “advice-giving” from 
the activities permitted to be delegated to a nonlawyer would be hard to defend and 
difficult to apply.  The only conceivable justification for such a categorical treatment of 
that activity would be a purely prophylactic one.  A creator of guidelines governing 
nonlawyer practice supervised by a lawyer might claim that the risks of harm to a client 
are so great from a nonlawyer’s advice giving that even a wise and experienced lawyer 
ought never be permitted to delegate a counseling activity to a nonlawyer colleague, 
regardless of the comfort level of the lawyer with the nature of the task and the 
qualifications of the nonlawyer.  That argument, though, is a remarkably weak one, as we 
have just seen.  Risk abounds in assigning any task to a nonlawyer, just as risks abound 
(albeit presumably lower ones overall) in the lawyer’s doing the work herself.  Some 
advice-giving tasks will objectively carry far less risk than some legal research tasks.  
The guideline creator’s prophylactic arguments would perhaps support a categorical ban 
on the use of legal assistants entirely, but not to carve out categorical distinctions within 
the panoply of activities that a lawyer engages in while representing a client. 
 
 We need not rehearse the similar arguments that would apply to a categorical 
exclusion of “negotiation” from the acceptable roles of nonlawyers in law firms.156  All 
of the same arguments would apply to that category as would apply to counseling.  There 
may, however, be other categories where some bright-line distinctions might be justified.  
Those categories have less to do with protecting client interests and limiting malpractice 
 
                                                 
155  Cf. State of Florida v. Foster, 674 So.2d 747, 754 (Fla. App. 1996).  In Foster, an independent paralegal 
conducted depositions without the supervision from or association with an attorney.  In affirming a finding 
of unauthorized practice of law, the Florida Court of Appeal wrote that “we hold that the non-lawyer 
appellees’ active participation in questioning witnesses in depositions, without the presence and immediate 
guidance and supervision of a licensed practitioner ... constitutes the unauthorized practice of law ....” Id.  
at 753.  In response to a motion to clarify its opinion, the court amended the preceding language to bar 
deposition questioning by nonlawyers “even under the immediate guidance and supervision of a licensed 
attorney.”  Id. at 754 (emphasis added). 
 That amended language in Foster, if it happened to constitute the substantive law in Florida 
(which it seemingly does not, as it was simply dictum in the matter before the court), would undercut the 
broad conduit concept developed in the text.  Besides its status as dictum, though, the court’s proposition is 
also of more limited value because of the close relationship between depositions and court testimony.  This 
Article has acknowledged from the beginning that nonlawyers cannot participate in court proceedings.  See 
text accompanying note  supra.  A deposition is, in many substantive respects, a preliminary version of 
court testimony.  See FED. R. CIV. PRO. 30, 32 (preserving objections during depositions); FED. R. EVID. 
804(b)(1) (using depositions at trial); cf. MODEL RULES, supra note  , at R. 3.3 cmt. [1] (including a 
deposition as a proceeding before a “tribunal” for purposes of the rule prohibiting false statements made to 
a tribunal). 
156  See State Bar of New Mexico, Rules Governing Paralegal Services, supra note  , at Rule 20-103; 
sources cited at note , supra. 
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risk, and more with recognizing the existence of the attorney-client relationship itself.  As 
long as this discussion accepts for present purposes the reality of unauthorized practice 
limitations, it would be sensible to conclude that a nonlawyer could not, on his own, 
establish an attorney-client relationship.157  Because only a lawyer may represent a client, 
only a lawyer may create the relationship.  Similarly, only the lawyer may decide to 
terminate the relationship.158  She may not delegate that responsibility to a nonlawyer 
colleague, regardless of his competence and experience.  Even accepting that categorical 
limitation on nonlawyer practice within a law firm, a lawyer may still assign to a 
nonlawyer tasks which implement each of those goals.  So, for instance, a nonlawyer to 
interview a prospective client, and, having reported to the lawyer the facts of the matter 
and having received the lawyer’s authority to accept the matter for representation, the 
nonlawyer may present the retainer agreement to the client for signature. 
 
IV. APPLYING THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK TO THE ELSI STAFF 
 
 In this Part, I apply the framework I have just outlined to the story of the CED 
Project within Essex Legal Services Institute (ELSI), the Massachusetts legal services 
office.159  The ELSI CED Project included one Massachusetts lawyer, Joe Bartholomew, 
whose familiarity with community economic development law was limited; an out of 
state lawyer, Dara Coletta, who knew national community economic development law 
extremely well from her practice in California; two law students, David Dahlstrom, who 
was a certified law student licensed to practice under the Massachusetts student practice 
rule, and Julie Lucia, who was not eligible to be certified under that rule; and a college 
intern, Mike Newman, a sophomore at Tufts University.  A crude understanding of the 
nonlawyer practice guidelines would conclude that any one of the unlicensed persons in 
the Project could assist Bartholomew in some preparatory tasks, subject of course to his 
supervision.  A more contextual and refined understanding of the guidelines will permit 
Bartholomew to assign work in a more principled fashion.  Let us review the 
opportunities available for each member of the team in light of the framework developed 
above. 
 
 Joe Bartholomew, the lawyer:  Bartholomew is a lawyer licensed in 
Massachusetts, so his is the easiest example for our consideration.  Bartholomew may 
provide all of the legal services to the client MCDC,160 but he must be sure that he is 
competent to do so.  As a long-time litigator, Bartholomew is not yet familiar with many 
of the laws, schemes, practices and regulations surrounding affordable housing 
development and real estate closings.  He may still represent MCDC, subject to his 
 
                                                 
157  Not surprisingly, much advisory authority notes that limitation.  See, e.g., MODEL PARALEGAL 
GUIDELINES, supra note  , at . 
158  See  Of course, once a lawyer has decided to end a relationship (for example, when all work has been 
completed satisfactorily), the lawyer may delegate to a nonlawyer the responsibility to communicate that 
fact to the client by letter or telephone call.  See, e.g., In Re Marino, 229 N.E.2d 23 (N.Y.App. 
1967)(permissible for nonlawyer to communicate to prospective client lawyer’s decision to decline matter).  
The decision to end the relationship may be a collaborative one, in which the lawyer relies upon the 
insights of her knowledgeable assistant, so long as the triggering decision belongs to the lawyer. 
159  For the CED Project description, see text accompanying note  supra.  
160  See text accompanying note  supra.  
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client’s informed consent,161 if he is capable of achieving the necessary competence 
through study162 or “through the association of a lawyer of established competence in the 
field in question.”163
 
 Bartholomew’s role in the CED Project does raise two questions.  First, may he 
obtain his competence by associating with Dara Coletta, the unlicensed lawyer from 
California who knows the community economic development law extremely well?  And 
second, as a novice at the new transactional work of the CED project, might he 
nevertheless supervise nonlawyers and assign them tasks?  The response to both 
questions is yes. 
 
 Model Rule 1.1 permits Bartholomew to become competent “through necessary 
study . . . [and] through the association of a lawyer of established competence in the field 
in question.”164  His intention at ELSI is to become competent by associating with 
Coletta, the expert from California, and learning from her.  If we assume for the moment 
that Coletta possesses the expertise to understand the federal affordable housing schemes 
as they operate in Massachusetts,165 Bartholomew may use her as his source of education.  
If she is not qualified as a “lawyer” with whom Bartholomew has “associate[d],” she still 
qualifies as a resource for Bartholomew’s “necessary study.” 
 
 
                                                 
161  A client should understand the competence level of his lawyer, and should provide informed consent if 
that the lawyer’s expertise is still developing.  See RESTATEMENT, supra note  , at § 52, cmt. d (noting that 
a client might choose to hire a lawyer without expertise); Alexis Anderson, Arlene Kanter & Cindy Slane, 
Ethics in Externships: Confidentiality, Conflicts, and Competence Issues in the Field and in the Classroom, 
10 CLINICAL L. REV. 473, 536 (2004)(discussing law student competence); Christopher Sabis & Daniel 
Webert, Understanding the “Knowledge” Requirement of Attorney Competence: A Roadmap for Novice 
Attorneys, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 915, 927 (2002) (noting importance of a client’s understanding of 
competence). 
162  MODEL RULES, supra note  , at R. 1.1, Cmt. [2] (“A lawyer can provide adequate representation in a 
wholly novel field through necessary study.”).  (While the ELSI story takes place in Massachusetts, I will 
refer to the Model Rules instead of the Massachusetts version of those rules in order to maintain 
consistency with the analyses from earlier parts of this Article.  The Massachusetts rules would not differ in 
any substantive way from the Model Rules.)  Because ELSI does not charge its clients, Bartholomew does 
not confront the complicated question of whether he can charge his clients for the time he needs to achieve 
competence.  See In the Matter of Fordham, 668 N.E.2d 816 (Mass. 1996)(suspending an experienced 
lawyer who charged excessive fees while preparing a novel type of case); Robert L. Wheeler, Inc. v. Scott, 
777 P.2d 394, 396-97 (Okla. 1989)(cannot pass on learning costs to client). 
163  MODEL RULES, supra note  , at R. 1.1, cmt. [2]. 
164  Id.  
165  This is a necessary assumption for the proceeding analysis, and not an unreasonable one.  Much funding 
for affordable housing connects to federal statutory and financing schemes.  See, e.g., SIMON, supra note  , 
at 19-26; Julianne Kurdila & Elisa Rindfleisch, Funding Opportunities for Brownfield Redevelopment, 34 
B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 479, 479-80 (2007); Peter W. Salsich, Jr., Saving Our Cities: What Role Should 
the Federal Government Play?, 36 URB. LAW. 475 (2004). 
 Coletta’s expertise in an area exclusively governed by federal law would not permit her to 
establish an office in a state where she was not licensed, even if she only practiced her federal work.  See 
Kennedy v. Bar Ass'n of Montgomery County, 561 A.2d 200 (Md. 1989); Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. Moore, 
722 N.E.2d 514 (Ohio 2000); Ginsburg v. Kovrak, 139 A.2d 889 (Pa. 1958) (cannot establish an office to 
offer only legal services based upon federal law). 
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 The fact that Bartholomew is a novice in the field of affordable housing and 
community economic development does not preclude him from using nonlawyers to 
assist him.  As a licensed lawyer he may still supervise the nonlawyer assistants, subject 
to his overarching fiduciary duties and his strategic judgment about the case.  This 
conclusion follows from the baseline unauthorized practice dogma described and 
explored above.166  The dogma assumes a generalized level of competence as a result of a 
lawyer’s passing the bar.167  The dogma trusts lawyers in ways that it cannot trust 
nonlawyers, by virtue of that bar admission status.  Therefore, as a matter of substantive 
law, Bartholomew may work with his team of nonlawyers on the MCDC matter, subject 
to his professional judgment about the competence of his team to accomplish the work 
for which MCDC has retained ELSI.  A significant factor in his achieving competence, of 
course, is the presence on the team of Dara Coletta. 
 
 Dara Coletta, the out of state lawyer:  Coletta is a lawyer in California, but in 
Massachusetts she is a nonlawyer, because she has not yet taken the Massachusetts bar.  
She therefore cannot practice in Massachusetts.168  She is not eligible to practice in her 
new state under the safe harbor provision of Model Rule 5.5(c)(1), which permits out of 
state lawyers to “provide legal services on a temporary basis ... that (1) are undertaken in 
association with a lawyer who is admitted in this jurisdiction and who actively 
participates in the matter,”169 because under any reasonable interpretation of that 
provision, Coletta is not practicing “temporarily” in Massachusetts.170  Any legal services 
 
                                                 
166  See text accompanying note  supra.  
167  See JAMES E. MOLITERNO, ETHICS OF THE LAWYER’S WORK 146 (2d ed. 2003).  See also HAZARD & 
HODES, supra note , at § 3.2, 3-3 (noting the profession’s assumption that bar passage and satisfaction of 
other entrance criteria provide per se evidence of competence to practice); Jeffrey M. Duban, The Bar 
Exam as a Test of Competence: The Idea Whose Time Never Came, 63 N.Y. ST. B.J. 34, 35 (1991) (noting 
the claim that “the Bar Exam, as a test of ‘minimum competence,’ serves to ‘protect the public against 
unqualified lawyers and promote public confidence in the legal profession”’). 
168  MODEL RULES, supra note  , at R. 5.5.  For a discussion of out of state lawyers and their practice 
opportunities, see Gillian Hadfield, Legal Barriers to Innovation: The Growing Economic Cost of 
Professional Control over Corporate Legal Market, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1689 (2008); Pamela A. McManus, 
Have Law License; Will Travel, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 527 (2002). 
169  MODEL RULES, supra note  , at R. 5.5(c)(1). 
170  The term “temporary” receives no definition in the Model Rules, but Comment 6 to Rule 5.5 implies a 
broad scope of the term: “There is no single test to determine whether a lawyer's services are provided on a 
single ‘temporary basis' in this jurisdiction, and may therefore be permissible under paragraph (c).  Services 
may be ‘temporary’ even though the lawyer provides services in this jurisdiction on a recurring basis, over 
an extended period of time, as when the lawyer is representing a client in a single lengthy negotiation of 
litigation.”  Id., at cmt. [6].  Despite that broad reading, it seemingly cannot apply to a lawyer who has 
made a permanent career change to the new state, and whose work for her clients is permanent work for a 
stable, in-state law firm.  The example from the comment, a “single lengthy negotiation,” supports that 
conclusion.  The ABA’s Commission on Multijurisdictional Practice, which developed the language in 
Rule 5.5, interpreted the “temporary” qualifier not to apply to a lawyer like Coletta.  See ABA CTR. FOR 
PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY, CLIENT REPRESENTATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY: REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON 
MULTIJURISDICTIONAL PRACTICE 25, n.36 (2002), available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mjp/home.html 
(last visited March 8, 2009)(“Rule 5.5(c) often will not apply to an extended residence in a law office in a 
jurisdiction in which those lawyers are not licensed, because the intended presence in the jurisdiction will 
not be ‘temporary’”). 
For an overview of the multijurisdictional issues leading to the recent amendments to Rule 5.5, see 
2 HAZARD & HODES, supra note  , at § 46.3; Stephen Gillers, Lessons from the Multijurisdictional Practice 
Forthcoming, 85 Indiana Law Journal                     Do not cite or quote without permission  
 
 SHADOW LAWYERING 38 
she provides to ELSI clients, then, are as a nonlawyer under the supervision of 
Bartholomew. 
 
 The framework developed above, including the refined understanding of the 
conduit conception, would conclude that Bartholomew possesses the discretion to 
delegate to Coletta considerable latitude in performing many of the legal tasks necessary 
for MCDC’s representation.  Under that framework, Bartholomew will represent MCDC 
as effectively as he can with the resources available to him, and the most valuable 
resource in his “toolkit” would be Coletta.  With Bartholomew exercising his judgment 
about her effectiveness and retaining responsibility for the final lawyering product, 
Coletta may interview constituents of MCDC or other persons with knowledge about the 
housing development, draft documents such as affordable housing covenants and deed 
restrictions,171 deeds,172 mortgages, etc., and conduct legal research, both within the 
federal law about which she has expertise but also on state and local law implications.173
 
 Coletta may also meet with constituents of MCDC, who serve as the 
organizational client agents for the representation purposes,174 and explain the law about 
the affordable housing projects and development.  She may only do so, however, as a 
conduit of Bartholomew, as his agent communicating the legal conclusions he is satisfied 
are reliable.  In the setting described here, where Bartholomew has developed his 
competence through Coletta’s expertise,175 the role configurations are delicately 
arranged.  Because we accept the unauthorized practice dogma’s assertion that Coletta 
may not practice law directly, Coletta cannot offer her own independent advice to the 
MCDC constituents.  To do so would constitute commission of a crime in 
Massachusetts,176 as in every state.177  But if we accept the refined conception of the 
conduit within the framework developed above, Coletta may provide that advice if 
Bartholomew employs her nonlawyer services as part of his representation of MCDC.  If 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Commission: The Art of Making Change, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 685, 686 (2002); Carol A. Needham, 
Multijurisdictional Practice Regulations Governing Attorneys Conducting a Transactional Practice, 2003 
U. ILL. L. REV. 1331, 1339 (2003). 
171  For a discussion of deed restrictions to ensure the continuation of the affordable quality of the housing 
being developed, see SIMON, supra note  , at 143-60 (“constrained property”). 
172  See Matter of Easler, 272 S.E.2d 32, 32-33 (S.C. 1980)(holding that drafting of deeds permissible with 
lawyer’s supervision). 
173  We saw above that paralegals often conduct legal research, and the advisory authority uniformly 
supports that delegation.  See text accompanying notes  supra.  If paralegals, most of whom have not 
attended law school, may perform legal research as part of a lawyer’s work for a client, it is readily 
apparent that Coletta, an expert and experienced lawyer in community economic development, may engage 
in legal research about that topic in a new jurisdiction. See Att’y. Grievance Comm’n. v. Hallmon, 681 
A.2d 510, 514 (Md. App. 1996). 
174  Se MODEL RULES, supra note  , at R. 1.13(a) (lawyer represents an organization through its duly 
authorized constituents).  For a discussion of the difficulties at times in discerning which constituents speak 
for the entity client, see MILTON C. REGAN, JR. & JEFFREY D. BAUMAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND CORPORATE 
PRACTICE 76-96; William H. Simon, Whom (or What) Does the Organization’s Lawyer Represent?: An 
Anatomy of Intraclient Conflict, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 57 (2003). 
175  See text accompanying notes  supra. 
176  Mass. General Laws c. 221, § 46A (prohibiting an “individual, other than a member, in good standing, 
of the bar of this commonwealth,” from practicing law). 
177  See notes  supra. 
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Bartholomew’s representation is competent because of his team’s collective work under 
his supervision, and if he assumes full responsibility and liability exposure for the 
representation, then Coletta’s activities are proper. 
 
 That same analysis would apply to Coletta’s negotiation, for instance, with a 
lender about the terms of a federal loan package, even if Bartholomew is not present 
during the negotiation,178 as long as the persons with whom she negotiates do not 
misunderstand her role or her status.179  Her signature on documents could bind the law 
firm and thus the firm’s client.180  If certain documents require the signature of a lawyer, 
then of course Coletta could not sign those papers.  And, while the example offered here 
is entirely transactional, if a dispute ended up in court, Coletta could not appear on behalf 
of MCDC in court absent pro hac vice permission from the court.181
 
 David Dahlstrom and Julie Lucia, the two law students:  We recall that Dahlstrom 
and Lucia are each law students working within the CED Project, but Dahlstrom is a 
“certified law student” under the state’s student practice rule,182 while Lucia is not.  
Before we examine what Bartholomew might delegate to a law student as a generic 
matter, we need to understand the effect of Dahlstrom’s certification.  If Dahlstrom’s 
status as a certified law student makes him effectively a lawyer, then he and 
Bartholomew are essentially to be treated the same, and Dahlstrom would in fact have 
more authority in Massachusetts to practice law than Coletta possesses.183
 
 In fact, in Massachusetts, like many other states,184 the student practice rule has 
very unclear applicability to transactional practice, and by its literal terms has unclear 
applicability to out-of-court legal work by a student representing a client in a litigation 
matter.  The Massachusetts rule allows a law student working with a legal services 
organization, among other settings,185 to “appear” in court in various contexts, on behalf 
 
                                                 
178  We saw above that supervision does not contemplate monitoring or constant observation, but instead 
envisions systems and other indicia offering the supervisor reasonable and reliable assurance that the work 
will be performed adequately.  See RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY, supra note  , at §7.05(1). 
179  See, e.g., DeVaux v. American Home Assurance Co., 444 N.E.2d 355, 359 (1983)(secretary’s actions 
created an attorney-client relationship by the client’s reliance); Rodriguez v. Montalvo, 337 F.Supp.2d 212, 
218 (D. Mass. 2004)(paralegal’s interaction with a client sufficient to trigger former client conflict of 
interest); Developments in the Law—Lawyers’ Responsibilities and Lawyers’ Responses, 107 HARV. L. 
REV. 1557, 1561 (1994). 
180  RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY, supra note , at 2.03, cmt. e (agents may bind principals). 
181  RESTATEMENT, supra note  , at . 
182  Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct. Rule 3:03. 
183  See Anderson et al., supra note , at ; Chavkin, supra note , at . 
184  See, e.g., Ariz. Sup. Ct. R. 38(d) (“may appear in any court or before any administrative tribunal’);  
Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 12-5-116.1 to -116.4 (West 2003) (“appear and participate in any civil 
proceeding”); Ga. Sup. Ct. Rules, Rule 91 (“assist in proceedings”); Ky. SCR Rule 2.540 (“appear in any 
proceeding in any court”); N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 22, § 805.5 (referring to civil and criminal 
court proceedings);  but see Ill.  ILCS S. Ct. Rule 711 (“may counsel with clients, negotiate in the 
settlement of claims, and engage in the preparation and drafting of legal instruments”). 
185  Third year students are within the rule’s ambit if they work for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, a 
municipality, a public defender office, or a legal aid office.  Mass. Rule 3:03(1); Order Implementing 
Supreme Judicial Court Rule 3:03.  The rule applies to a second year student who is enrolled in a law 
school clinical program.  Id., R. 3:03(8). 
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of indigent clients.186  The rule is silent about the proper role of the law student on behalf 
of a client apart from the court appearance itself,187 and the rule says nothing at all about 
law students representing clients in matters which have no relationship to a court 
proceeding, like in transactional community economic development matters.188
 
 Given the narrow applicability of the student practice rule, Dahlstrom and Lucia 
are situated identically in their status within the ELSI CED Project.  (In the litigation 
units of ELSI, of course, Dahlstrom would have the status of a licensed lawyer for his 
clients.)  Dahlstrom and Lucia, while law students, have the same status as any paralegal 
in any law office.  The “law clerk” status provides them no special rights or privileges by 
virtue of that station.  In fact, Dahlstrom and Lucia have the same conceptual status as 
Mike Newman, the college sophomore who serves as a volunteer intern for ELSI.  Let us 
introduce him into the mix, and compare how Bartholomew might use Newman’s 
volunteer services in comparison to the services of the two law students. 
 
 Mike Newman, the college sophomore intern:  Newman has volunteered at ELSI 
for this academic year.  He is a sophomore at Tufts University, and he is 19 years old.  
Unlike all of the other members of the CED Project team, he has no legal training.  He is, 
however, a nonlawyer assistant, and Bartholomew possesses discretion to assign to him 
certain discrete tasks in his best judgment as his client’s fiduciary. 
 
 This array of third-year law student Dahlstrom, second-year law student Lucia, 
and college sophomore Newman presents to Bartholomew an opportunity to understand 
contextually his responsibilities as a supervising lawyer using nonlawyers within his 
toolkit.  The best that the profession and its substantive law can say to Bartholomew is 
that he has discretion to assign to nonlawyers some of the units of work and activity that 
he would complete on his own if he had no assistance at all.  That discretion is cabined in 
critical ways by Bartholomew’s judgments about effective risk management and 
maintenance of competent practice, as well as the extent of his client’s buy-in.  It is 
extremely unlikely that Bartholomew would assign to Newman the task of drafting an 
affordable housing covenant, the complex document which when recorded binds future 
purchasers of the affordable units to maintain the unit’s affordable character.189  It is 
 
                                                 
186  Id.  Some settings, such as the state’s District Court and the Probate and Family Court, are covered 
automatically; other courts, such as the Superior Court and the courts of appeal, are open to student 
appearances at the discretion of the judge or justice hearing the matter.  The rule also does not define 
indigence for its purposes. 
187  Id.  By the clearest of implications, the rule authorizes students who may appear in court on behalf of an 
indigent client to engage in all aspects of the practice of law on behalf of that client outside of the 
courtroom. 
188  Virtually all states’ student practice rules share the narrow litigation focus found in the Massachusetts 
rule.  But see Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. X, § 10.03, at 
http://www.tncourts.gov/OPINIONS/TSC/RULES/TNRulesOfCourt/06supct1_9.htm#6 (last visited March 
8, 2009)(law students may “provide legal services to ... any person or entity financially unable to afford 
counsel”). 
189  For a discussion of affordable housing covenants, see, e.g., Cal. Health & Safety Code § 33334.6(e)(7) 
(requiring that certain affordability covenants run with the land); Julian Gross, Community Benefits 
Agreements: Definitions, Values, and Legal Enforceability, 17-WTR J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & 
COMMUNITY DEV. L. 35 (2007-08). 
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difficult to conceive of that delegation qualifying as an exercise of wise judgment on 
Bartholomew’s part, given Newman’s lack of experience and legal training.  Using the 
same metric, Bartholomew might ask Newman to locate the legal description of a 
property from the registry of deeds, and then to create a first draft of a deed for that unit, 
using the previous deed as a template.190
 
 Bartholomew might assign Dahlstrom, a third year law student who is licensed to 
represent clients in complicated housing litigation,191 to work on the affordable housing 
covenant that Bartholomew would not assign to Newman.  Bartholomew might also 
assign Dahlstrom to offer advice to the clients, depending on his comfort level with 
Dahlstrom’s mastery of the material and his judgments about how his best representation 
of the client.192  (Again, Dahlstrom would have lawful permission to counsel clients 
down the hall in ELSI’s Housing Unit.  Bartholomew could surely conclude that this 
talented law student has the capacity to advise the MCDC constituents about certain 
aspects of the law as it applies to the organization.) 
 
 Of course, Julie Lucia, as a second year student who is not a certified law student, 
falls somewhere in between Newman and Dahlstrom in her experience.  Bartholomew 
 
                                                 
190  See note supra (citing authority for deed drafting with supervision). 
191  Students may represent tenants in contested trials in Massachusetts under the state’s student practice 
rule.  See Darmetko v. Boston Housing Authority, 393 N.E.2d 395, 400 (Mass. 1979)(example of student 
representation at eviction trial).  Students also conduct criminal trials while practicing under a student 
practice rule.  See, e.g., Washington v. Moore, 421 F.3d 660, 662-63 (8th Cir. 2005) (law student 
“conducted bulk of” jury trial); Washington v. Glenn, 935 P.2d 679, 680-81 (Wash. App. 1997)(student 
conducted trial). 
192  Bartholomew has no obligation to offer to his clients the best services with the least risk exposure.  That 
statement may seem striking, but it must be true, or else the use of nonlawyers would disappear.  It is true, 
by and large, that lawyers will be more competent than nonlawyers, and that nondelegation would imply 
less risk for the client than delegation.  Lawyers frequently delegate, though, and delegation is an 
acceptable component of competent representation.  For clients paying by the billable hour, the answer to 
the riddle may be quite simple—the client would choose to save valuable fees if the risk exposure is 
minimal.  But nonlawyer practice appears in settings in which the client is not paying by the hour, as in 
contingency fee contexts or in fee for service representation.  See Ashby Jones, More Law Firms Charge 
Fixed Fees for Routine Jobs, WALL ST. J., May 2, 2007 (describing pressure from corporate clients to limit 
hourly fees).  It simply must be true that lawyers have permission to develop a mix of resources which 
together achieve competent service, even if some other efforts might minimally increase, at great cost, the 
opportunity for benefit to the client.  The standard of care for lawyers reflects common and ordinary 
practice, not the best practice possible.  See 2 RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL 
MALPRACTICE § 20.2, 1306 (2009 ed.) (describing the standard of care for lawyers as relative to lawyers in 
similar circumstances); see also Wood v. McGrath, 589 N.W.2d 103, 108 (Neb. 1999) (“whether the 
attorney exercised the same skill, knowledge, and diligence as attorneys of ordinary skill and capacity 
commonly possess and exercise in the performance of all other legal tasks”); Wooten v. Heisler, 847 A.2d 
1040, 1043 (Conn. App. Ct. 2004) (“exercise [of] that degree of skill and learning commonly applied under 
all the circumstances in the community by the average prudent reputable member of the profession”). 
 In the setting of free legal services, the clients have less autonomy rights regarding the allocation 
of the firm’s resources, because of the firm’s fiduciary responsibility to spread its finite resources over 
many clients.  I have examined that phenomenon in the past.  See, e.g., Tremblay, supra note ; Paul R. 
Tremblay, Rebellious Lawyering, Regnant Lawyering, and Street-Level Bureaucracy, 43 Hastings L.J. 947, 
962-63 (1992); Paul R. Tremblay, Toward a Community-Based Ethic for Legal Services Practice, 37 
UCLA L. REV. 1101, 1110-14 (1990). 
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will use her services in the same contextual way, discerning how she can assist in the 
endeavor in a responsible and competent way.  She might, after all, show as much innate 
skill and talent as the third-year student Dahlstrom, and Bartholomew may use her in a 
much more elaborate way.193
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 Lawyers commonly associate with nonlawyers to assist them in their performance 
of their lawyering tasks.  A lawyer cannot know with confidence, though, whether the 
delegation of some tasks to a nonlawyer colleague might result in her assisting in the 
unauthorized practice of law, because the state of the law and the commentary about 
nonlawyer practice is so confused and incoherent.  Some respected authority within the 
profession tells the lawyer that she may only delegate preparatory matters and must 
prohibit the nonlawyer from discussing legal matters with clients, or negotiating on 
behalf of clients.  Other authority suggests that the lawyer may delegate a wide array of 
tasks as long as the lawyer supervises the work of the nonlawyer and accepts 
responsibility for it.  A good faith lawyer reviewing the available commentary would find 
it difficult to achieve appropriate guidance for her work.  This uncertainty affects not 
only lawyers working with paralegals, but firms hiring out of state lateral associates and 
partners, and law school clinical programs engaged in transactional work. 
 
 This Article has sought to articulate a framework for assessing delegation choices 
which is both coherent and sensible.  It has shown that any sort of delegation of work by 
a lawyer to a nonlawyer involves an exercise of the lawyer’s judgment about an 
appropriate balance of risk and efficiency, along with an eye toward the client’s informed 
choice about how to achieve the goals of the representation most efficiently.  The 
prevailing unauthorized practice of law dogma prevents a client from seeking an 
economical representation by only retaining a nonlawyer, but that dogma trusts lawyers 
to protect a client’s interests.  With those considerations in place, this Article has 
concluded that the profession cannot, and in fact does not, deny the lawyer any 
categorical options in making delegation choices, except for those involving public court 
appearances.  Aside from sending a nonlawyer to court, a lawyer may responsibly 
delegate any of her lawyering activities to a nonlawyer associate, subject to the prevailing 
conceptions of competent representation and subject to the lawyer’s retaining ultimate 
responsibility for the resulting work product and performance. 
 
 Some commentary and some court opinions suggest a different answer to the 
questions posed here, but those authorities do not withstand careful analysis.  This Article 
has shown that a more careful reading of the commentary and the court dicta supports the 
 
                                                 
193  Experienced clinical teachers report that second year law students frequently demonstrate as much 
talent and effectiveness as student lawyers as third year students, and sometimes more.  For some empirical 
support for that sentiment, see Stefan H. Krieger, The Effect of Clinical Education on Law Student 
Reasoning: An Empirical Study, 35 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 359, 369 (2008)(only slight differences 
between second and third year students on certain empirical test measures). 
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framework and the thesis offered here.  Nonlawyers may not independently engage in 
activity which equates to the practice of law, if by “independently” we mean without 
supervision and oversight from a lawyer.  That important and uncontroversial limitation, 
however, is the only categorical restriction on a lawyer’s discretion.  A supervised 
nonlawyer may play a much more active and important role in a lawyer’s overall 
representation of her client than many have claimed.  For the client, that is a very good 
result. 
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